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RAILROAD RETIREMENT PENSION ACT OF 1934
AT the close of its last session, Congress passed the Railroad Retirement
Act,' which is the first government attempt in the United States to compel
private employers and employees to contribute jointly to the support of per-
sons who have become too old to continue profitably and safely to serve their
employers. 2 The problem of superannuation thus in part attacked has been
aggravated by the industrial era and its accompanying changes. The life span
of individuals has been increased by medical advances.3 At the same time the
1. 48 STAT. C. 868, 45 U. S. C. A. § 201-214 (1934).
2. The employer will assume two-thirds, and the employees one-third of the cost of
the retirement fund set up by the Act. The age limit is set at 65, subject to change upon
mutual agreement of employer and employee.
In practically every compulsory old-age insurance plan adopted by foreign nations,
pensionable age has been set at 65. Studies and Reports of the International Labour Office,
Series M, Compulsory Pension Insurance (1933) 15. Competent investigation In the
United States has determined the average of "partial impairment" of earning power to
be 65. EpsTm, CHALLENGE OF THE AGED (1928) 14-31; cf. 1 LATIMER, INDUSTRIAL PEN-
syou SYsTEms (Ind. Rel. Couns. 1933) 99-101. (Mr. Latimer is now chairman of the Rail.
road Retirement Board, set up under the Act.)
3. Eps=mz, op. cit. supra note 2, at 14-16; LATnr-ER, op. cit. supra note 2, at 170-179.
"In 1855 average life expectancy was 40; now it is 58, which means that many more
workers reach the age of possible dependency." CumMs, THE LABOR PRon amt zN Tr
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increasingly rigorous demands of industry on the mind and body of the work-
man has decreased the span of' the employment career. 4 Furthermore, the
long-run effect of technological progress has been to decrease the permanency of
employment as well as the possibility of reemployment.5 The cumulative result
is an ever-growing group of persons who are unable, because of age, to retain
or obtain industrial employment. Meanwhile the possibilities of support for
this group have been diminished. The shortened working span has decreased
the period during which savings could be set aside; the increased life span has
lengthened the period for which provision is to be made. Returns per unit of
labor have generally failed to provide a very large part of the working popula-
tion with more than a minimum of subsistence.6 Increased urbanization and
consequent decreased cohesiveness of the family unit has brought about a cor-
relative decrease in the probability of family support for the aged,? accentuated
UNna.E STATES (N. Y. 1932) 105-6. See also DAurHERTY, LAnop Pnoimzv n- Az nA c;
INnUSTRY (1933) 148. For percentages of age groups, see Psz sio:;s: Fum.. a .s r; Tim
DEvEoPmrT or PENsroN aND Ormm rrmxraNT Pu.zs (Dep't of Manufacture, U. S. C.
of C., 1929) 10.
4. EpsT=, op. cit. supra note 3, at 4-31; 2 LATrE, op. cit. supra note 2, at 833-837;
Polakov, Power as a Factor in Economic Readjustments (1933) 165 AmAL:s 30, 32;
Hearings Before the Senate Committee on Education and Labor on S. Res. 219, 70th Cong.,
2d Sess. (1929) 72, 113-115, 128. The period from 1890 to 1920 showed a decrease of 13.7q
in per centum of males 65 and over gainfully employed. Cua.ums op. cit. supra note 3, at
109; Cf. McAfee, Middle-Aged White-Collar Workers on the Economic Rach. (1931) 154
AN-NALs 32; Socl.m SECURiY a U= r STA--s (American A.s'n for Soc. Sec., Inc,
1933) 25-6.
Industrial civilization has tended to increase the amount of illness and accident among the
working class, thus hastening the infirmities of age and increasing old age dependency. Id.
at 108; Ersre=, op. cit. supra note 2, at 5-72.
5. In general, Epstein, Do we need Compulsory Public Employment Insufrarce? Yes
(1933) 170 ANNALS 21, 26; DAUGHERTY, op. cit. supra note 3, at 105. The evidence 'leads
to the belief that the older workers" (i.e. over 46) do not "secure new jobs as easily as" do
"the younger." THE ABsoRmon OF THME UNEIMP oED By Alamcw; L'anusmv (The Brook-
ings Institution Pamph. Series, Vol. 1, No. 3, 1929) 13-14, 18. "The so-called absorption of
labor displaced by machinery has not been as great as the lay-off." Scheler, Technologicol
unemployment (1931) 154 ANxArs 17, 25, 26.
For a pertinent analysis as to the railroad industry in the United States, see Witt Bowden,
Productivity of Labor and Industry, Part 3, Transportation Employees (1934) 38 Mo uny
LAB. Rav. 269-288.
6. DAuGuERTY, op. cit. supra note 3, at 104, 169-205; Epsrin;, op. cit. supra note 2, at
88-112. Daugherty points out that "Actually . . .wages of about half the workers are not
high enough to permit them to reproduce themselves, maintain themselves in physical and
mental health, and build up a fund for old age." DA UGH , op. cit. supra note 3, at 149.
Cummins comes to a similar conclusion, after an exhaustive survey of compAtent authority
from 1850 to 1932, and taking into consideration the rise in standard of living in determining
the worker's condition. Cumns, op. cit. supra note 3, at 126-136; see Murphy, Dependescy
in Old Age (1931) 154 ANNALs 38, 41. But cf. Tim SUPPORT or =im Acm: A RLEE or
CosDroNs =D PoposArs (Natl Ind. Conference Board, 1931) 9-17.
7. Epsmn op. cit. supra note 2, at 10; cf. PExoNs-FuND.a"nrArs n; mz Dlao,-




by the increasing disproportion between the older and younger age groups due
to a declining birth rate.8 Consequently, there is a large and growing number
of aged dependent persons for whom no provision has been made.0
Solution of this problem has progressed further in European countries than
in the United States, due in part to the fact that the industrialization process
reached its maturity earlier in those countries."0 Beginning with the second
quarter of the nineteenth century, industrial employees banded together in
mutual benefit societies-established in part for the purpose of providing old-
age pensions for their members. Their growth, however, was limited by the
low level and precarious nature of the average member's earnings, and by the
fact that their comparatively small and fluctuating membership made accurate
prediction of future pension burdens impossible. Only where the membership
was limited to the employees of a stabilized and prosperous industry, or in
the comparatively rare instances where the employer in such an industry sup-
plemented the society's funds with his own substantial contributions, were
such attempts successful. 1 Consequently, the various governments were soon
forced to provide supplements and substitutes for these private attempts. There
was first an effort to meet the problem by liberalizing the already existing poor
relief laws. Little progress was thus made, however, since such relief at best
8. EPSTEIN, op. cit. supra note 2, at 15-16; Studies and Reports of the International
Labour Office, Series M, Non-contributory Pensions (1933) 15. While in 1870, 3% of the
population of the United States was 65, and over; 4.1% was the figure for 1900; and 5% for
1930 (5,500,000 persons) FTEENTH CrNsus OF TE UNTr STATES, VOL. 3, Popdation
(U. S. Bur. of the Census, 1930) 576; cf. LATim, op. cit. supra note 2, at 17.
9. In general, see Hearing Before a Subcommittee of the Committee on Pensions on
S. 3257, 71st Cong., 3d Sess. (1931) 27, 105; Hearing Before the Committee on Pensions on
S. 3037, 72d Cong., 1st Sess. (1932) 5; 78 Cong. Rec., June 13, 1934, at 11806, 11810; Bren-
nan, Old Age Pension Legislation (1932) 7 NOTRE DAME LAwYER 433, 434; Denby, Do we
need State Old Age Pensions? Yes (1933) 170 ANNALS 93, 94-5; EPSTmN, op. cit. supra noto
2, at 48-53; SocIAL SEcurTy nT = UNITED STATES (American Ass'n for Soc. See., Inc.,
1933) 20-28. It was estimated in 1915 that approximately 1,250,000 persons, 65 or
over, depended upon public and private charity. SQUIER, OLD AcE DEENmDEcNY x rn
UNrro STATES (1912). It is estimated that there are at present at least several million
superannuated Americans, 65 years of age or over, who lack adequate support. N. Y.
Times, September 2, 1934 II, at 1, col. 4; N. Y. Times, Sept. 30, 1934, at 1, col. 7.
10. EPsTEn, op. cit. supra note 2, at 293-8; Studies and Reports of the International
Labour Office, supra note 8, at 5; cf. STuDENsxy, TAE PENSION PROBDE AND THE PHIL-
OSoPHY OF CoNTaBu ioxS (N. Y. Bur. of Mun. Research, 1917) 12-13.
11. Studies and Reports of the International Labour Office, supra note 2, at 5-6; Studies
and Reports of the International Labour Office, supra note 8, at 1-3; EPsTmI, op. cit. supra
note 2, at 294-5; SocIAL SECURITY IN T.lE UNITED STATES (American As'n for Soc. Sec.,
Inc., 1933) 68-69.
At least as early as 1818, there were also private charities organized in England for the
purpose of pensioning superannuated industrial workers, or their widows. One, organized
in that year, stated that its objects were to discourage pauperism and "to sustain that vir-
tuous spirit of independence" of those "who have survived every ability to aid themselves"
and "for whom no provision has been made... "Crr or LONDON GENEm AL PENsio Socimrv




provided inadequate financial aid having no relation to the applicant's former
standard of living and was associated with the traditional stigma attached to
pauper relief. This effort was shortly followed by government subsidization
of the private mutual benefit societies and other voluntary thrift systems. The
latter program was only partially successful, for the wage scale of the average
worker hardly afforded a living, let alone provision for future security?2 There
followed, in some countries, compulsory provision for workers in hazardous
and large-scale industries such as railroads. 3 In fifteen countries sinilar pro-
vision has been made for employees in all industries, 14 supplemented in some
instances by pensions for individuals not covered by the industrial systems. 3
Similar lines of development have taken place more recently in the Latin-
American, Australasian and African countries closely affiliated with Europe
by cultural and political ties.' 6 By compelling employers to contribute to the
support of the pension systems, forty-seven countries implicitly assert that
industry has a public responsibility to share the burdens arising from industrial
superannuation. Employees in forty-eight countries, and the governments of
thirty-eight also contribute.' 7 In all these countries, the introduction of com-
12. Studies and Reports of the International Labour Office, both cited in note 11, Supra;
EpsrT=, op. cit. supra note 2, at 295. Government subsidy of private systems is still found
in six countries, including Canada, France and Japan. DAUcmmTY, op. cit. supra note 3, at
861.
13. Studies and Reports of the International Labour Office, Supra note 2, at 6-10, 12.
This category includes workers in other transport industries such as shipping and *inig.
France had pension legislation for seamen as early as 1791, Belgium by 1844, Italy by 1861.
14. Id. at 12.
15. Hearing Before the Committee on Pensions on S. 3037, 72d Cong, 1st SEs. (1932)
41. Sweden and several of the Swiss cantons extend compulsory national pension insurance
to all persons, requiring contributions from age 16, as in Sweden, to the time of retirement.
Studies and Reports of the International Labour Office, Supra note 2, at 6-10, 128. In
nearly every instance, separate systems of protection, for individuals not covered by the
compulsory pension insurance systems are being absorbed into the latter. Id. at 2-4. Straight
noncontributory pension systems supported out of the public treasury are still found in ten
countries, including Great Britain and France. DAUGHMRTY, op. cit. Supra note 3, at S62.
16. Studies and Reports of the International Labour Office, supra note 2, at 6-10. An
estimated 95,000,000 persons are now covered by compulsory old-age pension insurance
systems of the various nations. This does not include several schemes for which statistics are
not available, and special schemes for seamen, railway workers, public officials and public
utility employees. Id. at 10. The principle of compulsory national old age insurance is now
accepted by some thirty nations. Most of these pension systems include protection against the
risks of invalidism and death, as well as old age. Studies and Reports of the International
Labour Office, supra note 8, at 3.
Arguments against the compulsory national pension insurance systems have taken the
following principal forms: (a) that such systems include a very large number of parsons
who are improvident, or are not in need of pensions; (b) that they result in the withdrawal
of a large amount of capital from its proper destiny in industrial enterprise. Id. at 126-128.
The International Labour Office study concludes that it "is almost universally agreed today
that the modern state is entitled and obliged, in the public interest, to make insurance
compulsory." Studies and Reports of the International Labour Office, supra note 2, at 5-6.
17. Studies and Reports of the International Labour Office, supra note 2, at 448-9. For
a competent analysis of the developments in foreign countries, with citation to statutory
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pulsory old age pension systems and consequent prevention of abject poverty
in old age have been accompanied by material reduction in disease and increase
in longevity among the working classes1 8
Although like problems are presented in the United States, progress toward
solution is less advanced. 19 Only as to government employees is there fairly
adequate provision for old-age security.2 0 Provision for the public exists
in twenty-eight states,21 but it is restricted to inadequate attempts to provide
sources, see United States Bureau of Labor Statistics Doc. No. 561, Public Old Age Pensions
and Insurance in the United States and in Foreign Countries (1932) 93, et seq.; cf. EPsTaN,
op. cit. supra note 2, at 293, et seq.
18. Studies and Reports of the International Labour Office, supra note 2, at 382-429;
Progress in Germany (1930) 4 OLD Ac SE UR y HRALD 1, 11.
19. It is estimated that 6,289,672 Americans were covered by, and 178,S67 persons
actually on the rolls of pension systems of all classes except war pension systems, in 1928-9.
This includes government employees, Carnegie Fund beneficiaries, Y. M. C. A. and
Y. W. C. A. secretaries, ministers, beneficiaries of trade union and private industrial systems.
THE SuPoRT OF THE Aa: A REvWmv oF CONDITIONS AND PRoPosALs (Natl Ind.
Conference Board 1931) 25.
20. About half the states have adopted plans for their own employees and for teachers,
while practically every large municipality has provided for policemen, firemen, teachers, or
others. DAUGHERTY, op. cit. supra note 3, at 865. While the municipal employee pension
movement began as early as 1857, that as to state employees began in 1911. U. S. Bureau of
Labor Statistics, Bull. No. 477 (1929) 1-2, 9; Bucx, MuNucn'A PENsioNs AND PENS101
FUNDS (1916) 2. State and federal pensions for judges have been in existence, at least since
1869. See De Wolf v. Bowley, 355 Ill. 530, 533-4, 189 N. E. 893, 894-5 (1934). The federal
government established a retirement pension plan for its own civil service employees in 1920,
41 STAT. 614 (1920), 5 U. S. C. A. §§ 691-9 (1929). It later extended the Act to employees of
the Panama Canal and Panama Railroad Company. 46 STAT. 1471 (1931), 25 U. S. C. A. §
409a (1933). It has also provided for employees of the District of Columbia, 41 STAT. 614
(1920), 5 U. S. C. A. § 693 (1927); 39 STAT. 718 (1916), 20 D. C. Code §§ 581-593 (1930).
Recently, a Federal Reserve Bank pension system has been proposed, to be established on
principles of compulsory contribution essentially similar to those now embodied In the
Railroad Retirement Pension Act. The proposal was to make the plan compulsory on officers
and employees of the twelve Federal Reserve banks, and optional with member banks.
Senate Report No. 751, to accompany S. 3657, 69th Cong., Ist. Sess. (1926); 1 LAInmt,
op. cit. supra note 2, at 37-9; 2 id. at 1168-9.
21. CAL. GENr. LAWS (Deering, 1932) Act 5846; Colo. Laws, 1933, c. 144; Del. Laws, 1931,
c. 85; IDAHO CoDE AiN. (1932) §§ 30-3101 to 30-3125; Ind. Acts 1933, c. 36; Iowa Acts,
Extra Session 1933-34, c. 19; Ky. Acts, 1934, c. 59; Me. Laws, 1933, c. 267; Md. Laws, 1931
c. 114, as supplemented by Md. Laws, Special Session 1933, c. 51; MASS. GEN LAws (1932)
c. 118A; MicH. CoirP. LAWS (Mason's Supp., 1933) §§ 8309-1 to 8309-42; Minn. Laws, 1929,
c. 47, as amended by Minn. Laws, 1931, c. 72, 138, as amended by Minn. Laws, 1933, c. 348;
MoNr. Rav. CODE ANN. (Choate, Supp. 1923-27) §§ 4541.1 to 4541.25; NED. CoM. STAT.
(Supp. 1933) §§ 68-201 to 68-227; NEv. Comp. LAWS (Hillyer, 1929) §§ 5109-5136; N. J.,
Stat. Service 1931, §§ 155-50 to 155-77; N. Y. CONSOL. LAWS (Cahill, 1930) c. 491/2, §§ 122
to 122-p; N. D. Laws, 1933, c. 254; Omno GEN. CODE (Page, 1934) §§ 1359.1 to 1359-30;
Ore. Laws, 1933, c. 284; Pa. Laws, Extra Sess. 1933-34, p. 282; UTAH Rry. STAT. ANN. (1933)
§§ 19-12-1 to 19-12-18; Wash. Laws, 1933, c. 29; Wis. STAT. (1931) §§ 49.20 to 49.39, as
amended by Wis. Laws, 1933, c. 375; WYo. Rav. STAT. ANm. (Courtright, 1931) §§ 84-201 to
S4-225. According to Progress in the Making of the Social Legislation Maps (1934) 24 Ar.
[Vol. 44
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meagre straight pension grants from the public treasury for the "pauper" aged 22
An attempt of Massachusetts to solve the problem by sponsoring voluntary old-
age insurance and savings, analogous to the earlier attempts in Europe, met
with scant success.23 Regulation of private pension systems, existing in at
least six states, has been desultory.2 4 For the most part, solution of the prob-
LAB. Lw. REv. 116-117, old age pension laws are now also in effect in Arizona, New
Hampshire, and West Virginia. The territories of Alaska and Hawaii also have such
legislation. Alaska Laws, 1915, c. 65; Hawaii Laws, 1933, Act 208.
Several state statutes of this type have been held in conflict with state constitutions, either
on the grounds that they sought to do more than provide for "paupers", or that they wer
in reality providing "gratuities" to private citizens. In re Opinion of the Justices, 78 N. H.
617, 100 AtL 49 (1917); Busser v. Snyder, 282 Pa. 440, 128 Atl. 80 (1925); cf. Board of
Control of the State of Arizona v. Buckstegge, IS Ariz. 277, 158 Pac. 837 (1916). All three
states, however, now have old-age pension systems.
22. While such systems now exist in twenty-eight states, pensions vere actually being paid
in only sixteen states (and the territory of Alaska) at the end of 1933, -a."ting only 115,547
persons in all, at an annual cost of $25,950,248, or an average monthly penion of $IS.71.
This is a drop of $5.97 in value of average monthly pension since 1931. There is growing
difficulty with regard to funds, especially in the states where the county bmrs the whole
cost. N. Y. Times, Sept. 30, 1934, at 1 col. 7. But cf. SoML SECUR IN Mn M rm Uhar
STATES (American Ass'n for Social Security, Inc., N. Y. 1933) 5, 121-4; United States
Bureau of Labor Statistics, supra note 17, at 2.
The typical state systems fix age of eligibility at 65 or 70, the more recent plans favoring
the former; require possession of citizenship and 10-20 years residence in the state; require
that the applicant have no more than $3000 in property and be without means of support.
Benefits are usually administered by local authorities and limited to a maximum of $1 par
day, or $30 per month. DAUGHERTY, op. cit. supra note 3, at 864; United States Bureau
of Labor Statistics, op cit. supra; United States Bureau of Labor Statistics, Bull. No. 4S9
(1929) 68-85; Analysis of Old Age Pension Bills Presented in 34 State Legislatures (1933)
7 OLD AGE Szcunrr HRAiz 6, 9.
At least since 1911, there has been a persistent attempt to compel universalization and
standardization of state old-age pension systems by means of a federal grant-in-aid to the
states. Up to 1929, over S0 bills and resolutions on the subject had been introduced in one or
the other house of Congress, but none had ever been reported out of committee. Since then,
S. 3037, the Dill-Connery Bill, providing for a $10,000,000 grant-in-aid to the states con-
forming their pension plans to a uniform pattern fixed in the Bill, was favorably reported out
of the Senate Committee on Pensions. (1933) 7 Om AoE Srcunrr HEnLD= 1. See alo
Epsrnn, op. cit. supra note 2, at 259-262; Soc.AL SEcun =x Tim U..rr STTs (Ameri-
can Ass'n for Soc. Sec., Inc., 1933) 7; Hearing Before the Committee on Pensions on S. 3037,
72nd Cong., 1st Sess. (1932); Hearing Before a Subcommittee on Pensions on S. 3257,
71st Cong., 3d Sess. (1931); Fillman, Old Age Pension Legislation (1931) 17 Am. BAR Ass'x.
Jo n. 438.
23. Epsme, op. cit. supra note 2, at 159, 209-10; United States Bureau of Labor Statistic,
op. cit. supra note 17, at 1.
24. Three states have provided some form of regulation of private contributory pmsion
systems through their insurance commissioners. MAsS. A=is. LAws (Lawyer's Co-op, 1932)
c. 32, §§ 39-41; Minn. Laws, 1919, c. 388, §§ 1-3; N. Y. CoNsot. LAWS (Cahill, 1930) c. 30,
§ 299 (1-8). Two states authorize stock corporations under certain conditions to pension
employees. Only New Jersey provides the safeguard that in case of revocation of such plans,
"any moneys contributed by employees" be returned to them. N. J. Laws, 1920, c. 175, § 1
(c) 3; PA. STAT. A~xi. (Purdon, 1930) tit. 15, § 651. One state specifically empowers em-
19341
YALE LAW JOURNAL
lem has been left with private industry. Yet the present attempts of private
industry are entirely inadequate to deal with the problem; and its ability
adequately to do so in the future is highly improbable. 25
The inadequacy of the private pension plans is shown, first, by the fact that
competitive forces limit their scope primarily to the employees of large-scale
industries. 26  Competitive forces make it unlikely that an industry would estab-
lish such a plan, unless it could thereby realize a gain. Gain could be achieved
through four principal sources: elimination of inefficiency due to age; the
improvement of employee morale as a result of the increase in employee ad-
vancement opportunities and the betterment of the employee's prospects for
old age; prevention of an unfavorable public reaction likely to result from un-
compensated dismissal of aged and faithful employees; and acquisition of
increased power over labor by virtue of the pension reward to be given or
withheld in the discretion of the employer.2 7 Only large-scale industrial units,
ployers to take out group old-age insurance annuities for employees. FLA. Rv. GEN. STAT.
(1920) § 4268. Two states authorize their savings banks, under certain restrictions to establish
pension systems. N. J. Com. STAT. (1910) p. 4714, § 69a; N. Y. CoNsoL. LAWS (Cahlill,
1930) c. 3, § 271. New York provides similarly as to savings and loan associations. N. Y.
CONSOL. LAWS (Cahill, 1930) c. 3, § 409-a. Pennsylvania and New York make similar
provisions as to insurance companies. N. Y.CoxsoL. LAWS (Cahill, 1930) c. 30, § 98; PA.
STAT. AN ;. (Purdon, 1930) tit. 40, § 439. Cf. Ormo Gmr. CODE (1910) § 1012; see LATI-
wER, op. cit. supra note 2, at 441, 672-4.
25. Recently, outstanding industrialists have come to similar conclusions Gerard Swope
suggested remedial measures by incorporation of pension systems in his scheme of industrial
self-government by trade associations, under federal supervision, FaDmxec, Tn. Swor
PLAxr (1931) 31-37. The Pension Committee of the New York Building Congress made up
of leading New York companies, suggested in 1932 that a compulsory system, supported by
the contributions of the state, the employer and employee, as in thirty-two foreign countries,
be substituted. Editorial, New York Building Congress Group Urges Extensiont of Old Age
Security (1932) 6 OLD AcE SECUrTy HERALD 1; 2 LATr am, op. cit. supra note 2, at 880-881.
Recent suggestions that provisions forpensions be incorporated in the NRA codes met with the
disfavor of social workers in the field of old age security, on the ground that such codes
are too temporary and uncertain. The NRA and Social Security (1933) 7 SoCLr SECUR.ITV 2.
26. "Over four-fifths of those . . . protected are employed by the railroads and In
public utility, iron and steel, petroleum, and electrical apparatus and supplies industrtes."
LATMEaR, op. cit. supra note 2, at 41, 54-59. See also 2 id. at 945; TnE SUPPORT or THE Aoro-
A RExviw op CoNDToNs AND PRoPosA rs (Natl. Ind. Conf. Bd., 1931) 32; Denby Jr. supra
note 54, at 98. Well over 90% of employees covered by industrial pensions are in industries
with more than one thousand employees. LATIMER, op. cit. supra note 2, at 57. The 87 largest
corporations in the United States, running less than 26%o of the company-operated plans,
employed approximately 84.7 of all employees covered by pension plans in "industrials,"
railroads, and public utilities. LATMER, op. cit. supra note 2, at 58.
27. Hearing Before a Subcommittee of the Committee on Pensions on S. 3257, supra
note 22, at 5, 11; Hearings Before a Subcommittee on Interstate Commerce on S. 3892 and
S. 4646, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. (1933) 24; SEN. Doc. No. 140, 70th Cong., 1st Sess. (1928)
130; PENsioNs-FuNnD~rTAns rN =E DEVELOPMENT OF PENSIONS AND OTnER RETIREMENT
PLANs (Dep't of Manufacture, U. S. C. of C., 1929) 25-28; ELEMrENTS OF INDUSTRIAL PENSION
PLA S. (Natl Industrial Conference Board, 1931) 2-10; CONANT, A CRTrcAL ANSALYSS or
INDusTRiAL PENSION SYSTEMS (1922) 4-45; EPsTEwn, op. cit. supra note 2, at 164; 2 LAT-
mxua, op. cit. supra note 2, at 749-789; 1 id. at 18-20; Bureau of Labor Statistics Bulletin
[Vol. 44
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for the most part, can, by reason of volume of operations and employment, re-
duce the pension cost per unit of operations to a point below the value of these
gains. In manufacturing, such units include a little more than half the total
workers in the United States.28 If this is typical of all industry, private pension
systems in 1932 covered scarcely thirty per cent of the employees of all large-
scale industrial units, or less than fifteen per cent of all industrial work-
ersY Secondly, even in this limited scope, the financial protection
afforded the individual worker is likely to be inadequate. Many indus-
tries have been unable, or unwilling, to grant pension benefits of substantial
amount.3 °  Comparatively few industries have been able, or willing, to
undertake the burden of guaranteeing the solvency of their pension systems
by devoting current income or surplus to a trust fund or to reinsurance to meet
currently accruing liability for future payments.3 1 The result in a period of
No. 489; Care of Aged Persons in the United States (1929) 288-292; Corey, Who wil ftay
the Utility Employee's Pension? (1930) 6 P. U. For. 323, 334; Schmidt, The Present Im-
passe of Old Age Pensions (1930) 5 Soc. ScL. 157, 162, 164-5. Al. W. Latimer states that
"a paramount consideration" in the introduction of the plans on the railroads was the pre-
vention of costly accidents due to age. LATrnu, op. cit. supra note 2, at 18.
One ground upon which corporations' acts of establishing a pension system has been held
not ultra vires as a carrying on of an insurance business without charter authority is that
the pension plan is designed to increase loyalty and efficiency, and improve employee morale,
Heinz v. National Bank of Commerce in St. Louis, 237 Fed. 942, 952-953 (C. C. A. 8th,
1916); Beck v. Pennsylvania Rr. Co., 63 N. J. Law 232, 241-2, 43 At]. 90S, 910-11 (1839).
28. This is on the assumption that large-scale industrial units are to be defined as those
with an annual production value of $1,000,000 or more. STA cAL Ansmcr or T E Uzrrm
STATEs-1933 (U. S. Bur. of Foreign and Domestic Comm.) 692; cf. 1 HAY-s, Oun Eco-
Nomnc Sys=rz (1928) 44-46.
29. 1 LArnm, op. cit. supra note 2, at 55; 2 id. at 893. This is based on an estimate that
27,889,000 were gainfully employed as such workers, and that 3,750,000 employees were
protected by private industrial pension plans.
30. In 1930, the average per capita annual allowance to pensioners was found by Latimer
to be from $700 to $710. That includes pensions to high-salaried corporation officials whos2
pensions might naturally be expected to raise the average considerably. For many indus-
tries the average seems to have been much lower. Lxr.rrn, op. cit. supra note 2, at 222-
224. Average pension allowance in dollar values seems to have risen only 38% from 1914 to
1927, having been $430 in the former, and $595 in the latter year. Id. at 222. Meanwhile,
according to the Federal Reserve Bank of New York index, general prices rose by nearly
75%. GPnAHAru, Puruc UTmr VALUATIO, (1934) 22. It would seem that real values of
average pensions did not keep pace.
31. 2 LATI , op. cit. supra note 2, at 588-594. One important burden involved in setting
aside such funds in trust would be that the company would have to substitute for such
trusteed capital with capital borrowed from outside at a higher rate of interest. 2 Lwxnsrre,
op. cit. supra note 2, at 650. But cf. Bradley, Joint Pension Fund for Railways (1930) 89
Ry. AGE 697.
Failure to fund, however, while resulting in lower cost to the industry at the outset of
the pension plan costs far more in the end. To meet accruing and accrued pension liability
for employee service as it arises, by means of a sinking fund, is to reduce ultimate cost by
the difference between the immediate capital outlay necessary when compound interest i.
allowed to do its work, and the future cost of meeting matured claims. Iee reprints, from
various issues of the Annalist of 1925, in Hearings Before a Subcommittee of the Committee
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financial stringency is the insolvency of many plans, deliberalization of others
and an increasing improbability that many will continue long to function.8 2
This financial instability in periods of business depression is further emphasized
by the fact that competitive forces in such a period result in the levy of a pro-
hibitive penalty against many pensioning employers. That is, the recession of
prices decreases volume of operations and correspondingly increases pension costs
per unit of operations, while existence of a heavy labor surplus tends to nullify
the value of the personnel control achieved by a pension system. 3 Thirdly,
the private pension system benefits have been accompanied by serious defects.
Under nearly all industrial plans, the prospective pensioner forfeits his pension
credit upon either separating from his company or being discharged by it at
any time prior to the age of retirement. In addition, most companies severely
restrict the possibilities of re-employment of such workers in the same company,
thus making it impossible for the worker to regain his pension credit. Other
companies by whom he may be re-employed will not recognize pension credit
earned elsewhere.M These provisions as to separation from service are typical
on Interstate Commerce on S. 3892 and S. 4646, supra note 27, at 377-389; LATIMER, op. cit.
supra note 2, at 272-3.
Mr. Latimer estimated that not more than 8% of employees covered by industrial pen-
sion plans in May, 1932, were "in companies with pension plans which offered guaranties
adequately financed on sound actuarial bases." 2 LATIMER, op. cit. supra note 2, at 890.
A recent opinion of a federal court, implying the belief that ratification of pension plans
by stockholders, particularly where guarantees to the employees are offered, is essential,
may presage legal restrictions further decreasing the possibility of adequate financial pro-
vision in the plans. Id. at 877, 889; but cf. In the Matter of the State-Wide Investiga-
tion ... of the Wisconsin Telephone Company, reported in Opinion and Order of Wisconsin
Public Service Commission (1932) 14-23, 70-73, discussed in 2 LATIMER, op. cit. supra
note 2, at 878-9.
32. 2 LATIMeER, op. cit. supra note 2, at 1090-91; Stark, Watchman, What of Out
Pensions (1933) 161 NEW OuTLoox 32; Kimball, The Pension of the Public Service Em-
ployee (1931) 7 P. U. FORT. 660; Schmidt, supra note 27. An investigation of Industrial
Relations Counsellors, Inc., shows that out of 418 companies operating pension plans in 1929,
covering nearly 4,000,000 employees, 40 had abandoned or suspended plans as to new em-
ployees by 1932; 61, affecting 1,074,639 employees, had deliberalized their plans; 12, affecting
170,774 employees, had changed from non-contributory to contributory or composite types,
in order to shift part of the costs to the employees. The investigation also showed that,
while all but four of the 69 new plans adopted between 1929 and 1932 had added to the
employee's contractual security by adopting the contributory or composite form, and all
but .one had been underwritten by some insurance company, all were much less liberal
than plans established in the previous period. These plans give little or no credit for
service rendered prior to installation of the plan, and reserve in the employer complete
discretion as to the age of retirement. SOCAL SECURITY IN TaE UNITE STATEs (American
Assn' for Soc. Sec., 1933) 49-53; 2 LATIMER, op. cit. supra note 2, at 841-890.
33. LATIMER, op. cit. supra note 4, at 293-4; Socrr. SWURITY IN IE UNITED STATES
(American Ass'n for Soc. Sec., 1933) 49; testimony of Donald Richberg in Hearings Before a
Subcommittee on Interstate Commerce on S. 3892 and S. 4646, supra note 24, at 14;
Schmidt, supra note 27, at 163; Rubinow, The Ohio Idea: Unemployment Insurance
(1933) 170 ANMA.s 76, 77.
34. Hearings Before a Subcommittee of the Committee on Interstate Commerce on S.
3231, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. (1934) 137; Hearings Before a Subcommittee of the Committee
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of the various provisions in the usual plan by which the lower paid vorker,
most in need of pensions, is discriminated against in favor of prospective pen-
sioners among subordinate officials and managementau Also, employers have
felt that only when the employee is aware of the fact that the employer retains
absolute power to withhold a pension at will can the maximum benefits of
increased labor efficiency and personnel control be attained; 30 and the employers
naturally hesitate to become bound to meet an indefinite financial burden in
the future. Consequently the usual pension plan stipulates that the employer
may modify or refuse the benefits thereof at will. 7 The resulting power of
the employer so greatly reduces employee independence that the resulting sit-
on Interstate Comzerce on S. 3892 and S. 4646, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. (1933) 403; Latimer,
Old Age Pensions in America (1929) 17 Am. L-%B. LEG. Ray. 55, 64-66; Editorial, United
States May Take Over Railroad Pension Plans (1934) 97 RY. AcE 143, 147. It has been
suggested that this be changed. FamaaIcx, THE SwoPE PLAN (1931) 31-37; cf. PM-sIoN;s-
FUDMNALS I =a D £vEoPmN op PENSIoN AN Orum Pr ,nm=n Pz ;s (Dep't
of Manufacture of U. S. C. of C., 1929) 3S. Employers generally feel that the threat of
forfeiture of pension credits by separation from the service is essential to securing the
economic gains of stable employment. CoNas-T, op. cit. supra note 27, at 89-91. Labor
leaders generally point out that such provisions are designed to destroy the vorkers
mobility and therefore his powers of collective bargaining. Id. at 39-41; 2 LAnnm op. cit.
supra note 2, at 758.
35. The worker in the lower-paid categories is most likely to he separated from
service previous to time of retirement. Another factor operating in favor of the hetter paid
class of prospective pensioner is the typical provision that the base for calculation of
pensions be average earnings during the last few years of service. Whereas employees
in the lower ranks receive relatively few pay increases during their working life, and wage3
of manual workers often tend to decline after their prime is passed, salaries of subordinate
officials and executives frequently increase with greatest rapidity in their final years of
service. The chances of death and disability also become greater in the lower-paid
categories, thus lessening their probability of receiving old-age pensions. 2 L,%,rnm, op. cit.
supra note 2, at 764-773. As to railroads in particular, see 1 id. at 34; Stark, Watch an,
What of Our Pensions (1933) 161 Nmv OuTtooz 32. Although contributory private pen-
sion plans generally do not discriminate as markedly, in view of their usual provision for
death and withdrawal benefits, it is pointed out that the increasingly common practice
under such plans, of returning the employee's contributions without interest upon hi
separation from service, amounts to "racketeering." Stark, supra, 33-4; cf. 1 Lwr=.
op. cit. supra note 2, at 164-5; 2 id. at 876.
36. Corey, supra note 27.
37. Stark, supra note 35, at 32, 35. The following is a typical provision: "Neither the
establishment of this Pension Plan nor any of its provisions, nor the granting of a pension
... shall be... construed as creating a contract ... or any right to a pnsion; and the
company expressly reserves ... its right to discharge any employee without liability . ..
whenever the interest of the company may in its judgment so require." Iu,-usm L PE;-
sIONs-RPoRr Or SPECIAL. CoMnME ON INDusRIAL PNsIONs Airo RaoTr OP A SUriVEV
oF INDUSTIAL PENSION SYSTEMS BY THE INDUSnuAL BuR.Au (N. Y. 1920) 42. Se
LA==, op. cit. mipra note 2, at 59-60; CoNANT, op. cit. supra note 27, at 50-51;
PEN5ioxs-FuNDA-.&ENTAIs r =u DEVELoPSIEN? or PENsioN AND OT=n RssE rr
P.ANs (Dep't of Manufacture, U. S. C. of C., 1929) 30-41. Courts have generally
abetted this employer attitude, both where employees have contributed to the pnsion
fund and where they have not, the usual theory being that the pension is a "gratuity"
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.uation has been characterized by a present member of the United States Supreme
Court as the "New Peonage."38
Inadequacies inherent in the private pension systems have been most apparent
in the railroad industry, partly due to the relatively longer history 0 of private
pension systems in that industry. The inadequacies are shown by the fact
that the average railroad pension, even when granted, has generally been among
the lowest of those of the various pensioning industries, offering to at least
twenty-five per cent of the pensioners no more than the equivalent of state
relief to aged paupers 40 There is the further fact that, without exception, the
railway pension plans reserve to the employers complete discretion to revoke
on the part of the employer. Eisner Co. v. Wilson and Co., Equity 30-1119 (S. D. N. Y.
March, 1929) unreported; Cowles v. Morris and Co., 330 Ill. 1, 161 N. E. 150 (1928);
McNevin v. Solvay Process Co., 32 App. Div. 610, 53 N. Y. Supp. 98 (4th Dep't 1898), aff'd
without opinion in 167 N. Y. 530, 60 N. E. 1115 (1898); Dolge v. Dolge, 70 App. Dlv. 517,
75 N. Y. Supp. 386 (4th Dep't, 1902); Strecker v. Consolidated Gas Co., 227 App. Dlv.
820 (1929); Pritchett-Thomas Co. v. Pennebaker, 10 Tenn. App. 425 (1929). Cf. Coo
v. Washington Mills Co., 149 Mass. 543, 21 N. E. 966 (1889); Clark v. New England
Telephone and Telegraph Co., 229 Mass. 1, 118 N. E. 349 (1918); Walters v. Pittsburgh
and Angeline Iron Co., 201 Mich. 374, 167 N. W. 834 (1918). Contra: McLemore v.
Western Union Telegraph Co., 88 Ore. 237, 171 Pac. 1049 (1918); Heinz v. National
Bank of Commerce in St. Louis, 237 F. 942 (C. C. A. 8th, 1916) semble. In general, see
United States Bureau of Labor Statistics, BLL. No. 489 (1929) 292.
38. BRANDEIS, BuSINESs A PROFESSION (1914) 75.
39. The first private industrial pension system adopted in the United States was that
of the American Express Company, set up in 1875, followed by that of the Baltimore
and Ohio Railroad Company in 1880. By 1905, railroad pension plans covered 35.5% of nil
railroad employees. The percentage jumped to 66.9% in 1908. LATIMER, op. cit. supra
note 2, at 20-28. There have been no new plans adopted since 1927. There are, at present,
84 railroad pension plans, covering in some form 94% of all carrier employees. Of these,
51 are formal plans, 23 informal, and 10 wholly discretionary. 82.4% of all carrier
employees are covered by the formal plans. Hearings Before a Subcommittee of the
Committee on Interstate Commerce on S. 3231, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. (1931) 91; editorial,
supra note 34; Brief for Defendants, The Alton Rr. v. The Retirement Board, Equity No.
57557, in the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia (1934) 6.
40. Of the 50,126 pensions in force December 31, 1933, 25% called for payments of less
than $30 per month, the average being approximately $54 per month. Only 2.6% of the
benefits exceeded $100 per month. Brief for Defendants, supra note 39, at 8. While the
average annual per capita pension for plans of all industries according to recent reports
was $605, that for railroads was $584. In both cases, these figures, of course, fail to reveal
the whole story, in that they include unusual pensions of executives and subordinate offi-
cials. LATrwmR, op. cit. supra note 2, at 223, 122-3. Yet, average earnings of railway
employees indicate that they are barely sufficient to provide a minimum of subsistence,
so that ability to provide for old age would be unlikely. A 1932 representative study of
wages of 1000 railway employees showed that only 78 earned between $2000 and $3000;
10% earned less than $500; 38% earned less than $1000; 66 2-3% earned leIs than $1500;
18% earned $1750, or more. Report of Dep't Committee to the Secretary of Labor,
Earnings and Standards of Living of 1,000 Railway Employees During the Depression (Gov't
Printing Office, 1934).
It is estimated that of all employees entering carrier service, only 17% could hope to
qualify for even these comparatively low annuities. Affidavit of M. W. Latimer, Brief
for Defendants, supra, at 7.
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or modify.4 This characteristic seemed to the employees to be obviously de-
signed to diminish their independence and hence their powers of collective bar-ga.ing.4s  Consequently there was a determined but unsuccessful attempt on
the part of the railway union workers to preserve their independence by estab-
lishing their own trade union pension systems. 44 The next effort on the part
of the employees was to secure Congressional action to remedy their condi-
tion.45 The question thus presented before Congress became more important
41. Ekern, Railroad Pensions (1934) 24 Am. L". Lro. Rxv. 124; Kimball, supra note
32, at 665.
42. 2 LATImE, op. cit. supra note 2, at 754-761. In practically no case, either on the
railroads or in other industries, have pension plans been instituted at the request of labor.
The attitude of organized labor has been negative, if not openly hostile. Id. at 758. At
the time of the railway shopmen's strike in 1922, an editorial reported that: "Next to
the seniority issue, railway executives state, that the matter of pensions has been the most
positive force in working for loyalty ..., for all strikers lost their pension rights." N. Y.
Times, August 6, 1922, as cited by EPsmnw, op. cit. supra note 2, at 164; but cf. LATnrzn,
op. cit. supra note 2, at 757, 759-60, 785. A fairly common provision in pension plans i3
the following: "A pension may be withheld or terminated in case of misconduct on the
part of the beneficiary or for other cause sufficient in the judgment of the Board to varrant
such action?' CoimA.r, op. cit. supra note 27, at 42, 41-45. Some railroad and other
industrial plans contain provisions empowering the employer to recall the pensioned employee
to service as a "scab" in event of strike. Hearing Before a Subcommittee of the Committee
on Pensions, on S. 3257, 71st Cong., 3d Sess. (1931) 5, 7-11; United States Bureau of
Labor Statistics, Bull. No. 489 (1929) 291.
43. A further complaint of labor is to the effect that pension plans tend to reduce
wages, since employers take the pension cost into account in bargaining with the employee.
It is therefore contended that the employee is losing his independence, without any real
compensation. United States Bureau of Labor Statistics, supra note 42, at 290. The
"deferred wage" theory as to pensions is widely accepted, both by labor protagonists and
others, including official bodies. Hearings Before a Subcommittee of the Committee en
Interstate Commerce on S. 3892 and S. 4646, supra note 27, at 17-19, 390; Sv.,. Do=. No.
140, 70th Cong., 1st Ses. (1928) 100; Report of Illinois Pension Laws Commis'on (1916)
282; Report of Connecticut Pension Systems Investigation Commi on, Conn. Pub. Doc.
No. 82 (1931) 8-9; Smn. Doe. No. 290, 61st Cong., 2d Sess. (1910) 109; ErST=m., op. cit.
supra note 2, at 213. Latimer states that at least part of the pension burden must ultimately
rest on the employee in the later stages of an unfunded plan, due to the excesive drain on
the employer as peak burdens are neared, and the consequent necessity to reduce wages.
2 LATnm, op. cit. supra note 2, at 784, 788-9. See also CoTAN.,r, op. cit. supra note 27,
at 67.
44. LATn.mR, TR AE UNiON PENsiox SYSMSs (Ind. Rel. Couns., 1932) 103-5; Latimer,
Old Age Pensions in America (1929) 17 Am. L.an. LEG. Rxv. 55, 64-66; Brief for the De-
fendants, supra note 40, at 6; see also Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen and Enginee
v. Pinkston, 55 Sup. Ct. 1 (1934). At the peak of the development of thee union efforts
to relieve old age dependency, 475,000 railway employees were covered in various ways
45. The movement officially began early in 1930, with the drawing up of a proposed
Congressional bill by representatives of eleven railroad labor unions. In all, perhaps eight
bills, the first in 1931, were introduced in both Houses of Congress on the subject,
previous to enactment. A persistent force behind the proposed legislation was the Railroad
Employees' National Pension Association, organized in 1930, and the Railroad Employees'
Pension Plan Booster Club, the latter resulting in the monthly publication of the R rno.,
PxxsioN Rvnw. See LAXnE, op. cit. supra note 2, at 34-5; 2 id. at 882-6, 1164-67.
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as a result of the depression. Reduced railroad operating returns resulted in
measures of pension deliberalization or even suspension.40 In addition, the
reduced volume of retirement on pensions, coupled with dismissal of younger
men in accordance with the railway seniority-rights system, raised the average
age of the railway employees and reduced advancement opportunities. 47 At
the same time, dismissal of younger men, rather than retirement of older men
on pensions, has to some extent aggravated the unemployment problem by
increasing the number of dependent unemployed. 48 These developments threat-
ened both employee old age security and railroad industrial peace. 49
46. Mostly since the 10% wage-cut agreement of 1932, 24 railroad pension systems
reduced pensions to existing pensioners by amounts varying from 10% to 40%. There was
nothing to indicate that such cuts would not be permanent. Many of the companies
reduced the percentage factors to be applied in the future against base pay in the calcula-
tion of benefits, thus seemingly making permanent revisions. 2 LATmR, op. cit. supra
note 2, at 863. The depression hit railroad pension systems with particular severity, as a
result of the fact that practically all of them have made no funding provisions. Hearings
Before a Subcommittee of the Committee on Interstate Commerce on S. 3231, 73d Cong.,
2d Sess. (1934) folded chart at p. 91. In other pensioning industries, on the other hand,
pension funds to the extent of $625,000,000 had been accumulated from 1920 to 1932. 2
LATimR, op. cit. supra note 2, at 893. While far from sufficient protection for most Indus-
trial units, these funds offered a strong contrast to the precarious railroad situation.
Many roads made no retirements short of compulsory age during recent years; some
suspended even that provision; and one road has made no retirements for three years.
Editorial, supra note 34, at 147.
47. As of April 1, 1930, 3.43% of steam railroad employees were 65 or over, compared
with 2.26% in coal mining, 1.50% in oil wells, 2.33% in the chemical Industry, 2.61% in
iron and steel, and 2.27% in transportation other than railroads. Furthermore, the average
railroad employee in 1930 was seven years older than the average employee in all Industries
other than railroads and eight and one-half years older than the average employee In the
communications industry and in transportation other than by railroad. Instead of reduc-
ing retirement ages, and also increasing amount of retirement, the railroads retired only
5,694 employees with pensions in 1933 as against 7,330 in 1932, and 7,417 in 1931. The
rate of retirement in 1934 has been even lower. Brief for defendants, supra note 39, at 11.
Federal Coordinator of Transportation Eastman points out that a survey by his staff
"shows that of the total employees in service on January 1, 1934, approximately 25 per
cent, or about 250,000 have already attained or will in the next four years attain the age of 69
or more or complete thirty years of service." Hearings Before the Committee on Interstate
and Foreign Commerce on H. R. 9596, 73d Cong., 2d Ses. (1934) 35. It is estimated
that 100,000 superannuated employees will be retired in the first year of operation of the
Act. 78 Cong. Rec., June 12, 1934, at 11499.
48. The seniority rules on the railroads are governed by the wage contracts, and are
inflexible. As the number of employees is decreased, the younger men are automatically
discharged, raising the average age of all employees at the same time. Brief for defendants,
supra note 39, at 25.
49. The bitter feeling aroused among railroad employees by the pension situation Is
indicated by the fact that the subject was a point of controversy In the wage disputes of
January, 1932, finally settled by the wage agreement of January 31, 1932. Item 3(D) of
that agreement provided that the subject be studied by a joint committee of employer
and employee representatives, with a view to asking for federal legislation, and that prompt
findings be made; neither party, however, committing itself "to accept or to await the
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It was to meet these problems that Congress passed the Railroad Retirement
Pension Act.O In so doing, Congress follows closely the line of old-age pension
development in many other countries that either began with a compulsory
pension system applied to the railroad industry, or have since made special
provision for that industry.P1 However, unlike those countries in which a simi-
lar development has taken place, action by Congress raises the question as to
whether the necessary power to adopt such legislation has been delegated to
the federal government by the Constitution. Specifically, that question is
whether the present regulation is a regulation of interstate commerce within
the meaning of the commerce clause. And even though it is such a regulation
of commerce, there remains the question of whether it is "unreasonable" under
the Fifth Amendment.
It is dearly established that Congressional regulation to promote the safety
of transport workers or of the public, is a regulation of commerce within the
meaning of the commerce clause.52 While there is no adequate evidence of a cau-
sal relation between increased employee age and increased tendency to acci-
dents that would endanger public safety, 3 it can be inferred from the evidence
results . . 2' N. Y. Times, Jan. 31, 1932, at 1, col. 5; (Text of Wage Agreement of Jan.
31, 1932) 134 Comm. AND Fni. CHEo. 916 (1932). Without even attempting the above
mentioned negotiation, the unions succeeded in having a pension bill introduced into both
houses of Congress in March, 1932. 2 LATrm=, op. cit. supra note 2, at 884.
50. Following a defeat on a motion for a temporary restraining order, on August 14,
1934, 134 Class I railroads, the Pullman Company, Railway Express Agency, and the South
Eastern Express Company succeeded in having the enforcement of the Act restrained by
a permanent injunction in the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia. The Alton
Railroad Company v. Railroad Retirement Board, Equity No. 57557 (1934), N. Y. Times,
October 25, 1934, at 41, col. 2.
51. A comprehensive compulsory system of retirements and pen-ions for railroad
employees was established in France in 1909 to supersede an even earlier compulzory
system for such employees, originally established in 1869. Canada first provided a plnaon
system for railroad employees in 1907, Uruguay in 1919, Argentina and Cuba in 1921, and
Brazil in 1923. United States Bureau of Labor Statistics Doc. No. 561, supra note 17, at
155, 162, 193; Studies and Reports of the International Labour Office, supra note 2, at 6-10
Argentina, Brazil and Uruguay initiated their program of compulsory old-age pension
insurance by applying it first to railroads only. Ibid.; cf. 78 Cong. Rec, June 14, 1934, at
11806-7. Most countries have introduced such insurance for railway vorkers. Id. at 30.
52. Hours of Service law cases: Baltimore and Ohio Rr. Co. v. Interstate Commerce
Commission, 221 U. S. 612 (1911); United States v. Kansas City Rr. Co., 189 Fed. 471
(D. C. W. D. Ark., 1911). Employers' liability: Employers' Liability Cases, 207 U. S.
463 (1907); Second Employers' Liability Cases, 223 U. S. 1 (1911). Safety Appliance
law cases: Southern Ry. v. United States, 222 U. S. 20 (1911); Chicago Junction Rr.
Co. v. King, 222 U. S. 222 (1911); Texas and Pacific Ry. v. Rigsby, 241 U. S. 33 (1915).
53. But cf. PEsIoNs FoR INDUSTRA AND Busnss E MTovr.s--R.ADo. P=M:o:;s
T = UErr D STATEs Am CANADa. (Ind. Rel. Couns. Prelim. Report, 1929) 13. It is
there pointed out that "The force of public safety considerations is apparent." Latimer
states that "the paramount consideration" behind the marked growth in railroad pansion
plans in the United States was that of "public safety" and avoidance by the companfs
of expensive damage suits likely to result from keeping in the service elderly p=rons
"no longer able to perform their tasks efficiently." LATn.mR, op. cit. supra note 2, at 13.
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that there is a disproportionate tendency to mortality and morbidity among
the higher age groups, once an accident has occurred.54 Thus the effect of age
upon an employee, if not increasing the chance of injury, may increase the
seriousness of any injury that does occur. It may also be inferred that as to
transport workers the strain of service at the higher age periods is so greatly
enhanced as to result in serious physical impairment." Consequently, since
retirement from service of aged workers does reduce the seriousness of the
effects of railway injuries, and prevent physical impairment of the employee by
reason of employment at an advanced age, the act may be said to increase their
safety and hence to be a regulation of commerce."
Moreover, the Railroad Retirement Pension Act is in a very large sense a
regulation of the relation of master and servant in the carrier industry. It is
intended to avoid the impending and actual breakdown of the private railroad
pension systems. The Federal Coordinator of Transportation has stated that
It may be shown that the strain of service exists with particular severity among workers
in actual transport (International Labour Office Brochure No. 353, OCCUPATION AND Ha.lxsr
(1934) 1-5); that there is a heavy relative increase in the incidence of heart disease and
similar maladies among older industrial workers (information based on a communication
of October 3, 1934 to the YALE LAW JouRNAL from the Actuarial Department of the
New York Life Insurance Company, and a communication of October 10, 1934, from the
National Safety Council); that, therefore, the heavy strain of transport service plus the
tendency to disease mentioned makes likely impaired physical condition of the older employee
dangerous to safety. Cf. THE OLDER WORKER 3 INDUSTRY (Nat'l Ass'n of Mfrs., N. Y.,
1929). On the other hand, actual statistics of industrial accidents tend to show a decreased
frequency among the upper age groups, adduced to be due to their relatively greater
experience. 2 LATIM:ER, op. cit. supra note 2, at 774; Hearing Before a Subcommittee of
the Committee on Pensions on S. 3257, 71st Cong., 3d Sess. (1931) 105; Hearings Before
the Subcommittee of the Committee on Interstate Commerce on S. 3892 and S. 4646, 73d
Cong., 2d Sess. (1933) 399-402; Is Age a Factor in Industrial Accidents? (August, 1930)
AumctA MurUAL MAGAZnE; Slocombe, The Dangerous Age in Industry (1930) 22 NATL.
SAa'ETY NEWS 68-9. These statistics, however, are not corrected to allow for the fact that
many of the older workers may be shifted to less dangerous tasks, thus rendering their
tendency to accident statistically slighter. During the past seven years of experience, the
death rate from accidents of all kinds in the United States, where the proportion of male
and female is the same as among ordinary insured lives (average being about 10% women
and 90% men) was .79 per 1000, at age 17; at age 27, 1.071; at age 37, 1.18; 47, 1.44:
57, 1.76; 67, 2.31. Communication from Actuarial Department of New York Life Insur-
ance Company, supra.
54. Denby, supra note 9, at 93, 96-7; communication received from National Safety
Council, supra note 53. The study reported in the American Mutual Magazine, which sum-
marizes practically all the available material, points out that not only does the older man
suffer more severely and take longer to recover from injuries, but the cost of compensating
him for injury is usually much above that of the younger employee. Thus, while the
study tends to show a relatively lower accident frequency in the group of 65 and over, It
concludes by recommending installation of a pension system for men over 65 as a financial
gain to the employer. Is Age a Factor in Industrial Accidents?, supra note 53.
55. Note 53, supra. See also GoLDBERG, OccUPATIoNAL DISEASES (1931) 247.
56. "The power to regulate interstate commerce is plenary and ...may be exerted to
secure the safety ...of those who are employed in such transportation." Southern Ry,
Co. v. United States, 222 U. S. 20, 26 (1911).
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that breakdown would "work havoc with employment relations.15 7  Whether
the pension promise of the private pension system be regarded as a promise of
a "deferred wage," for which the employee has paid in terms of lower past wage,
or solely as a promise of a "gratuity,' the fact remains that close to a million
employees have to some extent leaned their hopes for old-age security on that
promise. To the extent that the Retirement Act places those hopes upon firmer
and broader foundations, it is a measure of foresight well calculated to prevent
disruption of service by improving employment relations. It is well established
that legislation calculated to promote industrial peace in the interstate transport
industry is a regulation of commerceY8
A further possible form of regulation under the "commerce" clause, is that
designed to promote "efficiency in interstate transportation?." If "efficiency"
be strictly defined in terms of cost accounting, it connotes reduction of unit
costs. The Interstate Commerce Commission has shown that the additional
cost to the carriers of railroad maximum-hour-day legislation, for example,
was more than offset by subsequent increases in quantity-of-service-per-man-
hour and income-returns-per-man-hour-of-service s ° It may be argued that set-
ting a maximum to the number of years of service would tend to have a like
effect.61 As a closer analogy, it may also be shown that a primary purpose
of the federal civil service employees' pension system was to decrease unit
labor costs by elimination of superannuated employees holding their position
by seniority rights.6 2  Both analogies, however, are inconclusive on the point
57. Editorial, supra note 34, at 147.
58. Wilson v. New, 243 U. S. 332 (1917); Pennsylvania Ry. v. Railroad Labor Board,
261 U. S. 72 (1923); Texas and New Orleans Ry. v. Brotherhood of Railway and Steam-
ship Clerks, 281 U. S. 548 (1930).
59. Second Employers' Libality Cases; Baltimore and Ohio Rr. Co. v. Interstate Com-
merce Commission; Southern Ry. Co. v. United States; Texas and Pacific Ry. Co. v. Rigby,
all supra note 52; cf. Dayton-Goose Creek Ry. Co. v. United States, 263 U. S. 4S6, 473
(1923).
60. Hearings Before the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce on H. .R. 7430,
73d Cong., 2d Sess. (1933) 23, 28, 29; H. R. Doc. No. 496, 72d Cong., 2d So,-. (1932) 3-12
61. It is noteworthy, however, "that the economies in operation which tended to oiis t
the additional cost of the establishment of the basic 8-hour day (i.e., Adanson Act of
1917) were largely economies resulting in a reduction in the number of employees . . !,
H. R. Doc. No. 496, supra note 60, at 12. Similarly, one of the long-run items of effi-
dency which the employers would hope to obtain by means of the retirement pension system
would be the replacement of the superannuated, who hold by seniority rights with a pos-
sibly lower-paid and smaller number of men. Testimony of Transportation Coordinator
Eastman, Hearings Before a Subcommittee of the Committee on Interstate Commerce on
S. 3231, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. (1934) 161-2; LAThr, op. cit. supra note 2, at 774-778;
EmxroYErs R rsum= Axnns (Report of a Special Committee of the U. S. C. of C,
1929) 29; PEsrONs---FuuNDsExLs nT H DEvELoPir-sr oF Pnsio.; mum On= E-
Tm = PwAs, op. cit. supra note 3, at 28; Schmidt, The Present IrPasse of Old Age
Pensions (1930) 5 Soc. ScrsncE 157, 160; N. Y. Times, June 26, 1934, at 29, col 1. This,
of course, does not detract from the fact that the installation of the compulsory retirement
system would decrease the amount of unemployment.
62. It was estimated in 1911 that the Government stood to lose an average of $400,M0
per year as to employees in Washington, and $1,200,000 as to all cla.6fied civil service
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as to whether a compulsory railroad pension system with such relatively gen-
erous provision for benefits as the Retirement Act 3 will so far reduce unit
operating costs as to more than offset the resultant addition in pension overhead
per unit of labor, thus "improving the efficiency of interstate transportation"
0 4
in terms of cost accounting. But the increase in "efficiency" which may justify
legislation as to interstate commerce need not be defined in terms of cost
accounting. It may be defined, rather, in terms of increased adequacy of
the interstate transport system with respect to the public served by it. As a
most obvious example Congress could set joint rates for a group of carriers
under the Transportation Act of 1920, and divide the proceeds, not according
to shares of service rendered, but according to the needs of carriers, in the
interests of increased "efficiency" in terms of adequacy of carrier service as
a whole with respect to the public. It was unnecessary to prove that cost to
the individual carriers discriminated against would be more than offset by
any economic gains.6 5 Similarly, it may be argued that installation of a com-
pulsory retirement pension system is a regulation of commerce, in that the
elimination of inefficiency due to age is conducive to increased adequacy, and
therefore "efficiency," of carrier service.00
Granted that compulsory railroad pension legislation is a regulation of inter-
state commerce, there is a further possible objection to its validity under the
Commerce Clause. The Act applies to "any express company, sleeping-car
employees by continued failure to eliminate the superannuated through a retirement pension
system. H. R. Doc. No. 732, 62d Cong., 2d Sess. ('1912) 44-5; SE. Doc. No. 745, 61st
Cong., 3d Sess. (1911) 13-14; THE CIVIL SERvCE-MUNICIPAL AND PRIVATE SYSTEMS IN
THE UNITED STATES (Committee of One Hundred, Washington, 1912) 18-22. In lieu of
such a system, it has been widely contended that governments actually maintain "secret"
pensions in the form of sinecures or by paying wages to employees "retired on the job." SEN.
Doc. No. 290, 61st Cong., 2d Sess. (1910) 16-17; REPORT OF TnE CALoRNIA CoMuIISsiOx
oN PENSIONS o STATE E3PLOYEES (Sacramento, 1929) 8-9; REPORT or Com.tssio s Ar-
POINTED TO STUDY PENSION SYSTEMS IN THE STATE Or CONN. 1930-1931, CONN. Pun. Doc.
82 (1931) 11. As to English history on the subject, see THE CIVIL SEmvicE, supra, at 19.
63. The Act scales the percentage-of-pay factor, used in determining the pension annui-
ties to which the retired employee is entitled, as follows: 2% of the first $50, 1%ao of tho
next $100, 19 of compensation in excess of $150 and up to the $300 maximum. § 3.
On the other hand, all but one of the 73 existing formal and informal (not including purely
"discretionary" plans) railroad pension plans, which fix a definite percentage, set a flat
1% rate; and the one exception sets it at .776%. Hearings Before a Subcommittee of the
Committee on Interstate Commerce on S. 3231, supra note 61, at 91, see folded chart.
Thus, a recent study shows that, except for the Baltimore and Ohio, and the Pennsylvania
Railroad, substitution of the Retirement Act for existing voluntary pension systems will
raise annual pension costs for at least 22 Class I carriers from as low as $132,062 In the
case of N. Y., N. H. & H. Rr. Co., to as much as $2,424,511 in the case of the N. Y.
Central. Gates, New Pension System Cuts Into Rail Earnings (1934) 54 MAO, OF WALL
STRax 342. For comparisons of average per capita pensions under the private plans and
under the act, see Editorial, supra note 34, at 148-149.
64. Supra note 1, § 2.
65. New England Divisions Case, 261 U. S. 184 (1923). The point was not raised.
66. See excerpts from affidavit of Coordinator of Transportation Eastman, Brief for
Defendants, supra note 39, at 31-32.
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COMMENTS
company, carrier by railroad, subject to the Interstate Commerce Act." It
applies to any company that is directly or indirectly subsidiary to, or under
common control with, any of the above companies, and that is also engaged in
various-named essential functions connected with the transportation of persons
and property by railroad.6 7  Within certain limits as to age 3 and dates of
service,O the Act includes all employees of the above companies, without respect
to the character of service rendered. Its terms would thus include the railroad
legal staff, or accountants, or traffic solicitors, as well as the persons operating
interstate trains. Consequently the railroads contend that, within the meaning
of the Federal Employers' Liability Cases," at least one-fifth of the total num-
ber of employees covered by the Retirement Act do not "work in interstate
commerce or in work so closely connected therewith as to be a part thereof"
and that the Act is accordingly unconstitutional. 7'
However, the distinctions drawn in the Employers' Liability Cases have not
for all purposes drawn the line to which Congressional regulation of interstate
commerce may extend. The Employers' Liability law provided solely for an
improved remedy of the plaintiff railroad employee in negligence causes2 It
modified the relationship of employer and employee at a particular point in
space and time. Its administration involved simply a judicial determination
67. § I (a). The definition is identical with that used in the 1934 amendment to the
Railway Labor Act of 1926, 48 STA". c. 691 (1934), 45 U. S. C. A. §§ 151-162 (Cum.
Pamph. 1934).
68. Pensions are available to employees who have reached 65, or served a total of 30
years in "carrier" employment. § 3. To adapt the Act to possible individual deviations
of physical and mental capability from the fixed norm, provision is made for a maximum
extension of retirement age to 70, by mutual agreement between employer and employee.
§ 4. The Act penalizes employees with 30 years of service, who retire before 65, by
deducting 1/15 of the pension annuity for each year the employee is less than 65 at
retirement. § 3. An exception is made in the event that retirement is caused by mental
or physical incapacity.
69. The Act applies to all employees of "carriers" covered by the Act, who have been,
or will be, for any length of time in "carrier" service after Jupe 27, 1933. § 1 (b).
70. See note 52, supra.
71. Bill of Complaint (for temporary restraining order) Alton Br. Co. v. Railroad
Retirement Board, Equity No. 57557, Supreme Court of the District of Columbia (1934)
12-13. This would include at least 200,000 employees, to whom some $300,0,00.0 annual
wages are paid.
72. It eliminated the assumption of risk and fellow servant employer defenses of the em-
ployer. GAvir, THE CoM RcrsA CLAUSE (1932) 145-147. The amended Employers'
Liability Law applies to the employees of every common carrier by railroad engaged
in interstate commerce, while the employee is engaged in such commerce. The court
has given a general content to the first requirement in deciding cases. On the other
hand "employed in such commerce" has been assumed to be something other than
"engaged in interstate commerce"l in general, and has been filled with much more specific
content. Id. at 145-155, 219-220. Gavit is of the opinion that the "theory of the cas"
has been repudiated in the subsequent cases on the Second Employers' Act [compare the
opinion of Van Devanter, J., who rendered the opinion in the Second Employer' Liability
Cases, in Illinois Central Rr. v. Behrens, 233 U. S. 473, 477 (1913)], the Safety Appliance
Act, Intrastate Rate cases, and such cases as the Coronado Coal Co. cases. Id. at 219-220.
19341
YALE LAW JOURNAL
of a non-recurring relationship, created by an accident at that particular point
of space and time.73 Consequently, under the limitation imposed by the Court,
the liability regulation was still possible of effective administration as a regula-
tion of interstate commerce.7 4  The Railroad Retirement Act, on the other
hand, requires a large scale and minute administration, based on the total
periods of employment of each employee subject to the Act. It gives credit
to employees for service for any period of time, no matter how short, up to a
maximum total of thirty years, even though such service was intermittently
distributed over a period of many more years.76 It gives credit for service
rendered previous to the date of enactment to any carrier by any employee
who serves for any length of time subsequent to June 27, 1933. 7  To attempt
to restrict the administration of such regulation to a portion of a business
unit on the basis of categories created for a different purpose would create
insuperable obstacles.
From the point of view of administrative necessity, the type of analysis
possible for the determination of the Employers Liability Cases is impossible
of application to the present regulation. If that type of analysis were accepted,
then, in order to determine when employee and employer contributions are
due to the pension fund, the carriers, their employees and the Retirement
Board would continually have to make difficult, if not impossible, determina-
tions as to when the employee is doing interstate rather than "intrastate"
work. There could be no adequate check on the railroad reports of such
separate employment. Innumerable points of difficulty and contention would
arise in attempting to determine, on the same basis, to what extent the service
rendered prior to the enactment of the Act may be included in the compu-
tation of the amounts of the pension annuities payable, particularly in view of
the lack of records on the subject in the past. These elements of uncertainty
73. Even within these narrow limits, the problem of its administration in accordance
with the impractical lines drawn by the first Employers' Liability Cases has proved diffl-
cult and expensive. Schoene and Watson, Workmen's Compensation on Interstate Rail.
ways (1934) 47 HAuv. L. REv. 389. Cases under the Act have come to the following
"incongruous results," among others: "one who cooks food to be fed to a bridge-repair gang
is in interstate commerce, or one who carries water to a section hand is so engaged; but
one who places coal on a feeding chute to be used to feed an engine used in interstate
commerce is not so engaged; one who starts a pump to furnish water to an engine Is."
GAvrr, op. cit. supra note 72, at 153-155. See also ROBERTS, FEDERAL ;LIMTIrrs Or CAR-
Rnms (2d ed., 1929) 1073-1110, 1363-1514.
74. This would indicate that, at least as far as the question of administration of the
particular Act was concerned, the employees who were excluded did not have any connec-
tion with interstate commerce, since their exclusion did not impair its regulation. The
holding of the First Employers' Liability Cases was subsequently said by Mr. Justice Van
Devanter, in Illinois Central Rr. Co. v. Behrens, 233 U. S. 473, 477 (1913), to be to the
effect that the first Act was invalid because of its regulation of employers as to employees
whose "employment had no connection whatsoever with interstate commerce."
75. This is the so-caled "pooling of service credits" provision of § 1 (b). It is a legis-





would further impair the administration of the Act by rendering accurate
actuarial predictions of future pension expense next to impossible. Thus the
exclusion from the operation of the Retirement Act of all persons excluded from
the scope of the Liability Act would seriously impair its administration, indi-
cating that, for the purpose of the Retirement Act, many of these persons have
a direct connection with interstate commerce.
It is conceivable, however, that there are employees who are subject to
regulation by the terms of the Act, but whose regulation is not necessary to
make possible the administration of the Act. The group said by the railroads
to be engaged in "intrastate" commerce includes "mechanical employees;
executives and general officers and their staffs, not including the operating
vice presidents and their staffs; those engaged in accounting not having a direct
relationship to interstate transportation; those engaged in the construction of
buildings or of new equipment; those who devote themselves to finances, cus-
tody and administration of funds or to corporate proceedings and records; those
engaged exclusively in work relating to real estate taxes and titles, in the man-
agement, operation, care and protection of buildings or lands "not devoted to
,or used in connection with" transportation; men employed in coal mines;
clerical assistance in connection with the work mentioned."7 Yet, most of
these employees would seem to have a necessary functional intimacy with the
operation of an interstate transport system.78
Changes in the scope and complexity of business relationships have forced
the Court for an increasing number of purposes to mark the extent of permissible
federal regulation along functional lines."9 Thus, in order to insure the effi-
ciency and adequacy of the interstate transport system as a whole, Congress
may fix uniform rates and determine excess earnings for purposes of "recap-
ture" on the basis of the carrier's property investment and needs in both intra
and interstate commerce8 0 And where the rates imposed by a state may tend
77. See memorandum opinion of Wheat, C. J., holding the Act unconstitutional. Alton
Rr. Co. v. Railroad Retirement Board, Equity No. 57557, N. Y. Times, October 25, 1934,
at 1, coL 1 (Sup. Ct. D. C. 1934). The court held that many of these some 2G0,C0
employees "do not work in interstate commerce or in work so closely connected therewith
as to be a part thereof." See also page 12 of the bill of complaint on petition for a
temporary restraining order in the above case.
78. The Interstate Commerce Commi-ion includes these employees in its reports
without distinction, and takes them into account for purposes of determining the "fair
return" for the carriers, necessary to maintain adequate and efficient interstate transport
service. The Emergency Railroad Transportation Act takes all these employees into con-
sideration, both for purposes of coordination of railroad activities, and for purposes of
avoiding "wastes and preventable expense." 48 STAr. 211, 49 U. S. C. A. § 2S4 (1933).
Thus, in the report of the Senate Committee on the Emergency Railroad Transportation
Act, specific mention was made of "executives", now said by the railroads not to be in
interstate commerce. The hope was expressed that the "coordinator ... cut off unneces-ary
and fabulously high paid executives.' Smx. RaP. No. 87, 73d Cong., 1st SeS. (1933) 2.
79. GAvir, op. cit. supra note 72, at 219-220. "Every employee of a railroad engaged
in interstate transport is employed in interstate commerce in a factual sense." Id. at
153-155.
S0. See Dayton Goose-Creek Ry. Co. v. United States, 263 U. S. 456, 478-8 (1923).
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to lower operating revenues in interstate commerce, or result in the intrastate
traffic's failure to bear a fair share of the cost of the total enterprise, the federal
government may change such rates. 81 Similarly, it may regulate the issuance
of carrier securities with regard to the earning capacity of the interstate carrier
as a functional unit, irrespective of the "intrastate" nature of part of the com-
merce in which it engages.8 2  It may govern the abandonment or increase of
an interstate carrier's facilities in "intrastate" commerce, so as to prevent
increased costs that would impair the adequacy of the unit as a whole.83 It may
regulate the carrier employment relationship as to labor disputes without regard
to the character of the work done by the employees thus regulated. 84 The guid-
ing principle in these cases is that, if the subject to be controlled reflects ulti-
mately as a burden or benefit of importance to interstate commerce, the control
is valid.85
The constitutional question under the Railroad Retirement Pension Act
would seem to be determinable by the same considerations. The separation
between "inter" and "intrastate" employment, urged by those carriers covered
by the Act, would leave an estimated one-fifth of the carrier employees80 sub-
ject to the impending breakdown of the private pension systems. Not only
would their resultant bitterness from this source lead to industrial disputer
but the additional element of discrimination thus introduced would actually
aggravate the problem. The financial and other costs of such labor troubles
must necessarily reflect as a burden on interstate commerce. Secondly, fail-
81. New York v. United States, 257 U. S. 591 (1921); Wisconsin Railroad Commalon
v. Chicago, Burlington and Quincy Rr. Co., 257 U. S. 563 (1922); United States v. Village
of Hubbard, Ohio, 266 U. S. 474 (1924); cf. The Minnesota Rate Cases, 230 U. S. 352
(1912); Houston and Texas Ry. v. United States, 234 U. S. 342 (1913).
82. Pittsburgh and West Virginia Ry. Co. v. Interstate Commerce Commission, 293
Fed. 1001 (App. D. C. 1923), aff'd, 266 U. S. 640 (1924).
83. Colorado v. United States, 271 U. S. 153 (1926); Texas and Pacific Ry. v. Gulf
Ry. Co., 270 U. S. 266, 277 (1925); Texas and New Orleans Ry. Co. v. North Side Belt Ry.
Co., 276 U. S. 475, 479 (1928); cf. Railroad Commission v. Southern Pacific Co., 264 U.
S. 331 (1923); Alabama and Vicksburg Ry. Co. v. Jackson and Eastern Ry. Co., 271 U. S.
244 (1926).
84. Title III of the Transportation Act of 1920, 41 STAT. 470 (1920), 45 U. S. C. A.
§ 136 (1926), established the Railroad Labor Board, with authority to decide disputes
voluntarily submitted to it by either a carrier or its employees. The Act made no dis-
tinction as to "intra" or interstate character of employment. The Pennsylvania Railroad
sought to enjoin the Board from rendering a decision in a dispute submitted by a
union of railway shopmen, one of the categories of employment alleged by the railroads
in the present case to be invalidly regulated by Congress. The Court refused to enjoin
the Board's decision, and seems to have assumed the validity of the extension of regula-
tion to cover such a category of employment. The point was not raised. Pennsylvania
Railroad Co. v. United States Railway Labor Board, 261 U. S. 72 (1922); cf. Texas and
New Orleans Rr. v. Brotherhood of Ry. Clerks, 281 U. S. 548 (1930), applying to clerks.
85. Cf. Baltimore and Ohio Rr. Co. v. Interstate Commerce Commission; Southern
Ry. v. United States; Texas and Pacific Ry. Co. v. Rigsby, all supra note 52. As to the
Railroads' inclusion of accountants in the category of non-regulable "intrastate" employ.
ment, see Interstate Commerce Commission v. Goodrich Transit Co., 224 U. S. 194 (19-11).
86. An estimated 200,000 employees. See note 77, supra.
COMMlIENTS
ure to provide for these employees would entail failure to improve carrier
service, to the extent that the work of such superannuated employees neces-
sarly reflects on the adequacy of the transportation system as a whole.
Two additional grounds may be advanced upon which the extensiveness of
the regulation may be upheld. In the first place, Congress has obviously
attempted to confine the scope of the Act to those employers and employees
who, on the whole, control and affect interstate commerce. In passing upon
other regulation, though not under the commerce clause, the Supreme Court
has held that a general classification made by a legislature with a legitimate
end in view will not be overthrown because of the incidental inclusion of objects
otherwise not subject to its control. It has refused to invalidate the legislation,
but instead has merely excluded such objects from its scope when the occasion
arose.8 7  Thus the Court could sustain the constitutionality of the Act as a
whole, but by a process of definition exclude the few persons as to whom it
should not apply and to whose inclusion complaint could subsequently be made.
In the second place, the railroads may, if they choose, segregate such persons
as are engaged in mining, sale of electricity, or similar activities not sufficiently
related to interstate transport, under separate corporations, thus placing them
clearly outside the scope of the Act. s Any persons whom the carriers find are
too intimately connected with interstate business to make this possible would
seem for that very reason justifiably included.
Granted the power of Congress to regulate the subject-matter, the final ques-
tion is whether the Railroad Retirement Act imposes "unreasonable" burdens
upon the "carrier" industry, within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment. An
important objection to the Act proceeds on the basic assumption that legiAa-
tion as to interstate commerce can only be justified in terms of increased
gains to the instrumentalities of commerce, commensurate with the bur-
dens imposed. On the basis of that premise, opponents of the Act balance the
gains to the railroad industry against the very real expenses to be met in a
period of carrier financial exigency.P Alleging that at least the immediate,
87. Contrast Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U. S. 365 (1926) with Nectow v. Cam-
bridge, 277 U. S. 183 (1928); cf. Louisville and Nashville Rr. Co. v. Mfelton, 21S U. S.
36 (1910); Second Employers' Liability Cases, 223 U. S. 1, 52-53 (1911); Powell v. Penn-
sylvania, 127 U. S. 678, 685 (1888).
88. So-called "non-carrier" operations, such as mining of coal, holding of securities,
rental of properties, sale of electricity, seem to account for a relatively insignificant per-
centage of carrier expense. These are segregated on the carrier accounts under non-
operating income and expense. The accounts for 1932, for example, showed that the
expense of investment business for all Class I railways in that year was *31,827. Ir.rn-
sTATE COm=CE Co-Anu1ssioi, STATiSTICS OF RAILWYS (1932) S-56.
89. For some evidence of the economic difficulties involved, see Hearings Before a
Subcommittee of the Committee on Interstate Commerce on S. 3231, 73d Cong., 2d SeE3.
(1934) 84-4, 86-9, 93-6, 14-149; Gates, New Pension System Cuts into Rail Earn.ins
(1934) 54 MLAG. or WALL STmar 342; Editorial, The Railroad Dilemna, N. Y. Times,
July 17, 1934, at 18, col. 1. It is to be noted, however, that the figures given by the rail-
roads as illustrative of their decreased revenues due to water and bus competition are exag-
gerated by failure to record the fact that the railroad themselves, in many instances, own
such competitors. It is to be noted, also, that railroad estimates of earnings are to some
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if not the long-run, balance leans heavily to the side of expenses, they assail
the Act as having for its broader purpose the initiation of a social insurance and
re-employment program, in the interests of which, imposition on the carriers
is now attempted. 0
However, if Congress has the power to regulate the master-servant relation-
ship in interstate commerce, and if pension legislation is legislation as to that
relationship, the reasonableness of the particular measure may be justified in
terms of improvement of the general public welfare by a social insurance and
re-employment program. When Congress prohibits traffic in obscene litera-
ture,0 ' or unhealthy cattle, 2 or lottery tickets,93 or white slaves,04 or impure
foods and drugs, 5 or liquor prohibited by the state, 0 or prizefight films in
interstate commerce, 7 it surely is not increasing the revenues of the railroad
industry in any ordinary sense. It is, rather, using means of regulation which
"have the quality of police regulations. 01 8 It is so regulating the instrumentalities
of commerce, irrespective of the burden or benefit to them, as to "guard the
morals," 99 or "promote the general welfare, material and moral." 100 The Fifth
Amendment, in the field of federal activity, does not prohibit government regu-
lation for the public welfare.' 0' Thus, if it be assumed that railroad pension
legislation is unduly expensive in terms of concrete gains to railroad stock
and bondholders, the benefit in terms of social amelioration may be added to
the benefits in terms of improved carrier safety and service, and posed against
the expense, within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment.
A further consideration under the question of "due process" is whether
various specific means by which Congress has chosen to achieve its purpose
are "reasonable." The Act provides for the pooling of all retirement contribu-
tions from the various carriers and their employees.102 It thus treats the rail-
road industry as one employer, for the purposes of the Act. It thereby takes
the property of a carrier without an assurance that the return in annuities
to the carrier's employees will be proportionate to the expense. The purpose
extent calculated on the basis of an over-inflated capital and debt structure, for which
the carriers must be held largely responsible. GARTmR, GovzER1snM r PLANNIN0 Vog
INTERSTATE TRANsPORTAnTON (1934) 28 et seq. It would seem somewhat unjustifiable to
use such uncorrected figures as a basis for refusing to meet the problem of labor super-
annuation in the railroad industry.
90. See pages 10 and 11 of the bill of complaint in Alton Railroad Co. v. Railway
Retirement Board, supra note 71.
91. United States v. Popper, 98 Fed. 423 (N. D. Cal. 1899).
92. Reid v. Colorado, 187 U. S. 137 (1902).
93. Lottery Case, 188 U. S. 321 (1903).
94. Hoke and Economides v. United States, 227 U. S. 308 (1913).
95. Hipolite Egg Co. v. United States, 220 U. S. 45 (1911).
96. Clark Distilling Co. v. Western Maryland Rr. Co., 242 U. S. 311 (1917).
97. Weber v. Freed, 239 U. S. 325 (1916).
98. Hoke and Economides v. United States, 227 U. S. 308, 323 (1913).
99. The Lottery Case, 188 U. S. 321, 357 (1903).
100. Hoke and Economides v. United States, 227 U. S. 308, 322 (1913).




of pooling contributions is threefold; first, to iron out possible fluctuations in
mortality, morbidity, and wage rates, so as to make future annuity burdens
more predictable; second, to distribute the risk of loss from failure of employer
contributors; third, to reduce administrative costs.10 3 Financially sounder
concerns will to some extent be less benefited by such pooling. A company
that fails financially, however, is not likely, in view of the penalties of the
Act 0 4 and the disastrous effect on its own employment relations, to have been
long remiss in contributions. In actual practise, the number of roads completely
ceasing operations in even the most severe period of the depression, has been
insigificant. 0 5 Where that occurs, the discharge of a concern's employees,
following its demise, cannot add to the burdens of the plan. The pension
annuities for these employees would be based solely upon service rendered
prior to time of discharge and for which normal contributions had been made.100
The discrimination against sounder concerns would thus seem not of vital
importance.' 7
Congressional treatment of carrier employers as one unit for purposes which
such treatment is best adapted to achieve has been a frequent occurrence.
Congress may lay down blanket rates over all carriers, or by rate groups, or
by territories, and "recapture" the higher resultant earnings in the interests
of the less efficient.' 08  Congress may effect the same result by increasing joint
103. Cf. 2 LATimm, op. cit. supra note 4, at 943-4.
104. § 12: "On the failure of any carrier to make any payment when due under the
provisions of this Act, such carrier, unless excused by the order of the Board, shal pay an
additional 1 per centum of the amount of such payment for each month such payment is
delayed 2' Cf. § 13.
105. In 1932, a severe depression year for the railroads, the number of miles of road
involved in cases where operations ceased was 401, out of a total of 247,594 miles operated.
INTERSTATE CosrsracE CosnissrxOn, STATisrcs OF RAILWAYS (1932) s-4, s-5.
106. §§ 3, 5.
107. It is not to be denied that pooling will result in various subtle discriminations.
For example, discrimination will occur as against companies with a greater proportionate
share of employees in the higher-salary ranges, the higher-salary ranges being disfavored
under the Act. § 3. The variance in number of employees immediately eligible to retire
as between the various roads under the Act, in average age of employees, and in amount
of prior service will operate similarly. See page 18 of the bill of complaint in Alton Rr.
Co. v. Railroad Retirement Board, supra note 71. Mr. Eastman has pointed out that "In
general, railway employees in the East are older than they are in the West. Employee
contributions which are uniform in relation to payroll, or to some other fixed base, would
in general result in the eastern railroads paying less than their share of the cost and the
western carriers paying more!' Hearings Before a Subcommittee of the Committee or
Interstate Commerce on S. 3231, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. (1934) 159; but cf. Brief for the
Defendants, Alton Rr. Co. v. Railroad Retirement Board, supra note 39, at 60. It is
possible that the administrative cost of attempting to prevent such discriminations under
the Act would far exceed the cost which may at present be incurred by roads so dis-
criminated against.
108. Dayton Goose-Creek Ry. Co. v. United States, 263 U. S. 456 (1923). The fact
that the purpose of promoting the adequacy of the interstate transportation system as a
whole was achieved under a rationale of trusteeship does not detract from the essential
validity of the power exercised. The Emergency Railroad Transportation Act of 1933.
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rates for a group of carriers and dividing the shares of return, not according to
the shares of service rendered, but according to the degree of financial embar-
rassment. 09 It may compel the "sharing of one company's terminals with one
or more companies as a permanent arrangement," in the interests of the effi-
ciency of the whole system. 1 ° It may compel the pooling of all coal-cars of
various owners in a particular mine district and the limitation of each mine
to a pro rata share, irrespective of the individual contractual rights and duties
of the carrier or private shipper."' It may even constitute independent car-
riers fictional agents of each other for the purpose of improving the unit con-
venience and responsibility of the carrier system to the public. 12 The ques-
tion is not, whether the individual carrier has been forced to contribute more
than its rateable share of property. It is, rather, whether the public interest
in the adequacy of the transportation system as a whole justified the dis-
crimination.113
A second problem of due process raised by the administrative provisions
of the Act is its provision for giving credit for service rendered prior to the
date of enactment by employees subject to the Act. 1 4 Theoretically, the
provision makes it possible for perhaps a million former railroad employees,
not at present covered by the Act, to secure full pension credit for prior service
rendered, perhaps, in the distant past, merely by securing re-employment with
any carrier subject to the Act, for any length of time.115 Actually, the carriers
supra note 78, in repealing the recapture clause of the Transportation Act of 1920, pro-
vided for a pro rata return of the existent recapture fund to those carriers from whom sums
had been recaptured. If the trusteeship theory was sound, it would seem that the sum
subject to recapture, being an excess over fair return to the railroads, never became the
property of the carriers. As pointed out by the Court, the carrier simply held the fund
as a trustee for the benefit, presumably, of the United States, the real owner, who might
distribute the fund in accordance with the needs of the transportation system as a whole.
If so, under what theory could the Government give back to the carriers money which
never belonged to them?
109. New England Divisions Case, 261 U. S. 184 (1923).
110. Railroad Commission v. Southern Pacific Ry. Co., 264 U. S. 331, 343 (1923); cf.
United States v. New York Central Rr. Co., 272 U. S. 457 (1926).
111. The Assigned Car Cases, 274 U. S. 564 (1926); cf. Interstate Commerce Commis-
sion v. Illinois Central Rr. Co., 215 U. S. 452 (1910).
112. Atlantic Coast Line Rr. Co. v. Riverside Mills, 219 U. S. 186 (1911).
113. Decisions with respect to the exercise of state police power furnish what is In some
respects an even closer analogy. Noble State Bank v. Haskell, 219 U. S. 104 (1910); Able
State Bank v. Bryan, 282 U. S. 765 (1931) (pooling assessments on the deposits of all of
a state's banks in the interests of the "ulterior public advantage" afforded by a deposit
guarantee system). Mountain Timber Co. v. Washington, 243 U. S. 219 (1916) (pooling
assessments from employers on the basis of total payroll and degree of industrial hazard, for
the purpose of securing compensation to workmen for industrial injury and death). While
these cases arose under the 14th Amendment, it is to be noted that the federal power as to
the functions demarked for it by the Federal Constitution are as unrestricted as the police
power of the states with respect to residual functions. Nebbia v. People of the State of
New York, 291 U. S. 502, 525 (1934).
114. § 3.
115. There being some 700 carriers subject to the Act (most of them subsidiaries and
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seem to have already made impossible the re-employment of such persons, at
least, since the date of enactment.11 6 The problem assumes greater practical
importance, however, in relation to the general validity of pension payment
for service rendered prior to the date of enactment by employees now covered
by the provisions of the Act. It may be argued that payment for prior service
cannot improve the quality of present and future interstate carrier service.
Thus viewed, the Act effects an unconstitutional retroactive resurrection of,
and addition to, a wage contract discharged by full past payment." 7 State
courts have often faced the same pension problem in connection with state
constitutional provisions prohibiting "gratuities," "extra compensation" above
the contract wage to government employees subsequent to rendition of service,
or devotion of public funds to a private purpose. Almost uniformly, prior
service provisions in government employee pension plans have been sustained
on the ground that they are compensation to the employee for remaining with
the service and thus lending to the service in the future the benefit of his past
experience.' 18 The argument seems tenuous. Nevertheless, the fact that it is
practically uniformly accepted indicates that vital considerations, seldom men-
tioned, are behind the sterile legal approach. One of those vital considerations,
mentioned by at least one court, is the prevention of the dissatisfaction and
bitterness of the older employees, detrimental to efficiency of the service. 1 0
Another, not less vital, is the fact that the full benefits of a pension system in
terms of security for retired employees could probably not be achieved within
a generation of the date of enactment, were the system robbed of its prior
service provisions.' 20 These arguments seem not less pertinent, when applied
companies under common control with the larger companies), the carriers contend that
such a provision would invite widespread fraudulent attempts to secure temporary carrier
service for purposes of receiving pension credit for prior service. Hearing Before a Sub-
committee of the Committee on Interstate Commerce on S. 3231, 73d Cong., 2d Scs-3. (1934)
133; see pages 18 and 19 of the bill of complaint in Alton Rr. Co. v. Railroad Retirement
Board, supra note 71.
116. Testimony of Mr. Eastman, Federal Coordinator of Transportation, Hearing Before
a Subcommittee of the Committee on Interstate Commerce on S. 3231, 73d Cong., 2d Sen.
(1934) 162.
117. Hearing Before a Subcommittee of the Committee on Interstate Commerce on S
3231, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. (1934) 124-34; cf. Beck v. Pennsylvania Rr. Co., 63 N. J. Law
232, 43 AUt. 908, 911 (1899).
118. O'Dea v. Cook, 176 Cal. 659, 169 Pac. 366 (1917); Hughes v. Traeger, 264 IM.
612, 106 N. E. 431 (1914); People v. Abbott, 274 Ill. 3S0, 113 N. E. 696 (1916) (payment
for prior service is payment for service for which insufficient compensation was originally
made); Porter v. Loehr, 332 M1. 353, 163 N. E. 689 (1928); DeWolf v. Bowley, 355 I. 530,
189 N. E. 893 (1934); Fellows v. Connolly, 193 Mich. 499, 160 N. W. 381 (1916); Ham-
mitt v. Gaynor, 144 N. Y. Supp. 123 (Sup. Ct. Special Term 1913); City of Philadelphia
Police Pension Fund v. Walton, 182 Pa. St. 373, 38 At!. 790 (1897); State v. Levitan, 181
Wis. 306, 193 N. W. 499 (1923); O'Neil v. Blied, 188 Wis. 442, 206 N. W. 213 (1925).
Contra: State ex rel. Heaven v. Ziegenhein, 144 Mo. 282, 45 S. W. 1099 (1893); State
v. Kimmel, 256 Mo. 611, 165 S. W. 1067 (1914).
119. State v. Levitan, 181 Wis. 306, 193 N. W. 499 (1923).




to a private industry. Furthermore, an important purpose of the retirement
plan is to improve employee morale and efficiency by removing the fear of
old-age insecurity. To render the present and future annuity more adequate
by giving pension credit for past depreciation of the human item would seem to
be an apparently reasonable method of accomplishing that purpose.121
It cannot, of course, be pretended that the line of reasoning herein presented
is, alone, conclusive. Yet in the light of the social problem with which the
Act deals, and in view of the broad powers of railroad regulation already found
necessary to be exercised by Congress, the present regulation seems permissible.
However, the fact that it controls employer activity with regard to individuals
who have, for other purposes, been hitherto deemed to be solely within the
jurisdiction of the states may seem to require a doctrinal extension that would
impair previous categories created by the Court. This has already led one
judge to declare the Act unconstitutional.122  If the effect of the Act would
be to extend federal control at the expense of the states, the objection would
have some importance, But the Act would not do this, since the states could
not in fact effectively exercise their jurisdiction in this field because of the
very administrative difficulties that make federal control necessary. And even
though the present Act be declared unconstitutional, its repassage in a modified
form to meet the present objections might force the railroads again into the
very position from which they now seek to escape. The administration of a
restricted form of the same regulation might well be so expensive as to render
improbable in practice any substantial deviation from the requirements of the
present Act.
CORRECTION OF DAMAGE VERDICTS BY REMITTITUR
AND ADDITUR
THE efficiency of judicial administration is hampered by the granting of new
trials, with their concomitant delays in final adjudication and increased costs to
litigants." Courts and legislatures have sought to avoid these evils by eliminat-
ing retrials for both excessive and inadequate verdicts.
121. It is immaterial that the incidental effect (in this case, addition to a past wage) of
achievement of the valid purpose may be such that, standing alone, it would invalidate
the legislation. See McCray v. United States, 195 U. S. 27, 63-4 (1904); Arizona v.
California, 283 U. S. 423, 456 (1931) ; cf. Stephenson v. Binford, 287 U. S. 251, 276 (1932);
Weber v. Freed, 239 U. S. 325, 330 (1916).
just as in the case of a statute regulating hours of labor, the Retirement Act leaves the
railroads free to bargain with their employees with respect to amounts of wages to be
paid under the changed circumstances. Cf. Bunting v. Oregon, 243 U. S. 426, 435 (1917).
122. Alton Rr. Co. v. Railroad Retirement Board, nuPra note 50.
1. "The consequence [of awarding new trials] has been to prolong litigation, to swell
bills of cost, to delay final adjudication, and, in a large number of instances, to have such
excessive judgments repeated over and over, upon the new trial." Alabama Great Southern
Rr. v. Roberts, 113 Tenn. 488, 493, 82 S. W. 314, 315 (1904). "It is thus held in reserve
as a last resort, because it is more expensive and inconvenient than other remedies . . .
Lisbon v. Lyman, 49 N. H. 553, 600 (1870).
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When the jury has returned a verdict for unliquidated damages which the
trial court deems excessive, but not caused by passion or prejudice, most Amer-
ican jurisdictions allow the court to deny a new trial on condition that the
plaintiff agree to a remission of the excess above an amount which the court
considers reasonable. 2 Appellate courts, also, may order a remittitur as a condi-
tion of affirmance when the lower court has failed to act,3 or, with the consent
of the prevailing party, may require a further remission of a verdict already
reduced below.4 The discretionary authority of trial and appellate courts to
grant consent remittiturs is often confirmed by statute.?
A few courts, on the ground that the use of remittiturs is unconstitutional,
refuse absolutely to allow them," or permit them only when the exact amount of
the excess may be computed mathematically. 7 But the constitutionality of the
2. Arkansas Valley Land and Cattle Co. v. Mann, 130 U. S. 69 (18SS); Gila Valley
Ry. Co. v. Hall, 13 Ariz. 270, 112 Pac. 845 (1911), aftd, 232 U. S. 94 (1914); Hepner v.
Libby, McNeill & Libby, 114 Cal. App. 747, 300 Pac. 830 (1931) ; Noxon v. Remington, 78
Conn. 296, 61 AUt. 963 (1905) ; Brause v. Brause, 190 Iowa 329, 177 N. W. 65 (1920) ; Bro-
hammer v. Lager, 194 S. W. 1072 (Mo. 1917) ; Silverglade v. Von Rohr, 107 Ohio St. 75, 140
N. E. 669 (1923); Duaine v. Gulf Refining Co., 2S5 Pa. 81, 131 At. 654 (1926); Placella
v. Robbio, 47 R. I. 180, 131 At. 647 (1926); Miles v. Fall River County, 50 S. D. 240
209 N. W. 360 (1926); Yarrough v. Hines, 112 Wash. 310, 192 Pac. 886 (1920). See Note
(1933) 18 IowA L. REv. 404.
3. Becker Bros. v. United States, 7 F. (2d) 3 (C. C. A. 2d, 1925); Alabama Co. v. Tal-
madge, 207 Ala. 86, 93 So. 548 (1921), writ of error denied, 259 U. S. 575 (1922); Dor-
oszka v. Lavine, 111 Conn. 575, 150 At. 692 (1930); Florida East Coast Ry. Co. v. Hayes,
67 Fla. 101, 64 So. 504 (1914); North Chicago Street Rr. v. Wrixon, 150 III. 532, 37 N. E.
895 (1894); Burdict v. Missouri Pacific Ry. Co., 123 Mo. 221, 27 S. W. 453 (1894); Corr
v. Omaha, 122 Neb. 323, 240 N. W. 312 (1932); Holmes v. Jones, 121 N. Y. 4619 24 N. E.
701 (1890); Chester Park Co. v. Schulte, 120 Ohio St. 273, 166 N. E. 186 (1929); Barry v.
Chester, 23 Okla. 340, 100 Pac. 519 (1909); Meenan v. United Electric Rys. Co, 153 At.
881 (R. . 1931); Alabama Great Southern Rr. Co. v. Roberts, 113 Tenn. 483, 82 S. W. 314
(1904); Texas & New Orleans Rr. Co. v. Syfan, 91 Tex. 562, 44 S. W. 1064 (1898); Belt
v. Lawes, 12 Q. B. D. 356 (1884); Fleming v. Bank of New Zealand, [190D] A. C. 577.
4. Key West Electric Co. v. Higgs, 136 So. 639 (Fla. 1931); Lepchen-l-i v. Mobile &
Ohio Rr. Co., 332 M1o. 194, 59 S. W. (2d) 610 (1932); Brown v. Southern Pacific Hr. Co.,
7 Utah 288, 26 Pac. 579 (1891).
5. AL A. CoDo AsNY. (Mlichie, 1928) § 6150; ARiz. REv. CooVE Ar-m. (Struckmeyer, 1928)
§ 36S2 (consent of both parties required); ARx. DIG. STAT. (Crawford & MoJses, 1919)
§ 1313; CoxN. GEN. STAT. (1930) § 5647; ILL. REV. Snri. (Smith-Hurd, 1933) c. 110, § 216
(1) (f); Nan. Cossp. STAT. (1929) § 20-1929; T.x. AmN. Civ. STAT. (Vernon, 1925) arts.
1861, 1862; VA. CoDE (Aichie, 1930) §§ 6333, 6335.
Occasionally, statutes provide that no new trial may be granted until plaintiff has been
offered and has refused an opportunity to remit. See IAL ss. GCxx. L.ws (1932) c. 231, §
127; R. I. GaN. LAws (1923) c. 348, § 12.
6. Southern Ry. Co. v. Montgomery, 46 F. (2d) 990 (C. C. A. 5th, 1931); Louisville &
Nashville Rr. Co. v. Earl, 94 Ky. 363, 22 S. W. 607 (1893). See Watt v. Watt (1905)
A. C. 115 [overruling Belt v. Lawes, 12 Q. B. D. 356 (1884); Fleming v. Bank of New
Zealand (1900) A. C. 577J.
7. Tifton, Thomasvlle and Gulf Ry. Co. v. Chastain, 122 Ga. 250, 50 S. E. 105 (1905);
City of East Point v. Christian, 40 Ga. App. 81, 149 S. E. 50 (1929); Unfried v. Baltimore
& Ohio Rr. Co., 34 W. Va. 260, 12 S. E. 512 (1890) ; Thompson v. Davis Colliery Co., 104
W. Va. 493, 140 S. E. 489 (1927).
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practise has almost unanimously been upheld as violating neither the Seventh
Amendment of the Federal Constitution, which guarantees preservation of the
right of trial by jury, nor similar provisions in state constitutions.1" The power
of the court to determine whether the damages awarded are excessive is said nec-
essarily to imply authority to determine an amount that would not be exces-
sive.'" Consequently, in giving the plaintiff an option to remit the excess or sub-
mit to a new trial, the judge is not usurping the function of the jury by arbitrar-
ily fixing the amount of recovery, but is merely indicating the greatest amount
which could have been allowed to stand.'2 The plaintiff who has voluntarily
accepted the remittitur is not prejudiced and therefore cannot later complain
of the court's action. 13 The defendant is deprived of no right, and since he is
benefited by the reduction, he cannot object.14
Occasionally, courts have arbitrarily reduced a verdict although the plaintiff
has not been afforded an opportunity to remit, or even after he has refused to
remit. But notwithstanding the undoubted efficacy of such a procedure in pre-
venting plaintiffs from forcing new trials in the hope of recovering larger
damages than could be retained by consenting to a remittitur,1 it has been
declared unconstitutional in almost every instance.' 8 As a result, if the prevail-
8. Arkansas Valley Land & Cattle Co. v. Mann, 130 U. S. 69 (1888); Alabama Power
Co. v. Talmadge, 207 Ala. 86, 93 So. 548 (1921); Sewell v. Sewell, 91 Fla. 982, 109 So. 98
(1926); Burdict v. Missouri Pacific Ry. Co., 123 Mo. 221, 27 S. W. 453 (1894); Hender-
son v. Dreyfus, 26 N. M. 541, 191 Pac. 442 (1919); Alter v. Shearwood, 114 Ohio St. 560,
151 N. E. 667 (1926). Also see cased cited notes 2 and 3, supra, most of which have
assumed the constitutionality of remittiturs to be beyond question.
9. U. S. CoNsT. Amend. 7: "In suits at common law, where the value in controversy
shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and no fact tried
by a jury shall be otherwise re-examined in any Court of the United States, than accord-
ing to the rules of the common law."
10. Most of the state constitutions merely provide that the right of trial by jury or the
right as it heretofore has existed, shall be preserved inviolate. Louisiana has no constitu-
tional guaranty of jury trial in civil cases. See note 46, infra.
11. Arkansas Valley Land & Cattle Co. v. Mann, 130 U. S. 69, 74 (1888).
12. Florida East Coast Ry. Co. v. Hayes, 67 Fla. 101, 109, 64 So. 504, $06 (1914).
13. National Malleable Castings Co. v. Iroquois Steel & Iron Co., 333 Il1. $88, 165 N. E,
199 (1929); O'Connor v. Pawling & Harnischfeger Co., 191 Wis. 323, 210 N. W. 696 (1926).
However, statutes in some states allow plaintiffs to remit under protest and preserve a
right of appeal. See NEB. Coz". STAT. (1929) § 20-1929; TENN. CODE (1932) § 8988; VA.
CODE (Michie, 1930) § 6335.
14. Arkansas Valley Land & Cattle Co. v. Mann, 130 U. S. 69, 74 (1888); Boyer v.
Anduiza, 90 Ore. 163, 175 Pac. 853 (1918) (if any error was committed in reducing the
judgment, it was favorable to defendant who cannot complain); Weatherspoon v. Stack-
land, 127 Ore. 450, 271 Pac. 741 (1928).
15. See (1922) 35 HARv. L. REv. 616; Note (1933) 18 IowA L. REV. 404.
16. Kennon v. Gilmer, 131 U. S. 22 (1888); Johnson v. Louisville & Nashville Rr. Co.,
204 Ala. 662, 87 So. 158 (1920); Barber v. Maden, 126 Iowa 402, 102 N. W. 120 (1905);
Cazzell v. Schofield, 319 Mo. 1169, 8 S. W. (2d) 580 (1928); Bourne v. Moore, 77 Utah
184, 292 Pac. 1102 (1930); Borowicz v. Hamann, 193 Wis. 324, 214 N. W. 431 (1927); geo
Chester Park Co. v. Schulte, 120 Ohio St. 273, 290, 166 N. E. 186, 191 (1929).
A few jurisdictions apparently allow courts to correct excesses due to miscalculations
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ing party does not agree to remit, the sole recourse of the tribunal is the grant
of a new trial.17
The function of remittitur in terminating litigation is somewhat impaired by
the rule that a verdict excessive because of bias, passion or prejudice' s may not
be reduced by remittitur. A new trial is required because the improper motives
of the jury may have led to an incorrect verdict on the question of liability as
well as damages.19 However, a number of jurisdictions sanction remittiturs,
in the discretion of the court, even when passion and prejudice are found; - 3
others confine the use of remittiturs exclusively to verdicts tainted by passion
and prejudice and decline absolutely to interfere with verdicts which are merely
excessive.21 But even where passion and bias do not preclude remittiturs, the
on the part of the jury, or refusal to follow instructions as to the amount of
damages, without requiring consent of the plaintiff. Wichita & Colorado By.
Co. v. Gibbs, 47 Kan. 274, 27 Pac. 991 (1891); Security Benefit Ass'n v. Kibby, 220 Ky.
330, 295 S. W. 164 (1927); Linson v. Barnes, 136 Okla. 237, 277 Pac. 233 (1929); Mullin V.
Gano, 299 Pa. 251, 149 Atl. 483 (1930).
17. Sewell v. Sewell, 91 Fla. 982, 109 So. 93 (1926); Plecas v. Devich, 72 Utah 578, 272
Pac. 197 (1928); cf. Ralston v. Philadelphia Rapid Transit Co., 267 Pa. 278, 110 Ad. 336
(1920). See also, cases cited note 16, supra.
The new trial may be restricted to the issue of damages. lay Department Stores v.
Bell, 61 F. (2d) 830 (C. C. A. 8th, 1932); Porter v. Taylor, 107 Conn. 63, 139 At. 649
(1927); Beaulieu v. Tremblay, 130 Mle. 51, 153 At. 353 (1931); Vacuum Oil Co. v. Smoeck-
ler, 282 Mass. 361, 185 N. E. 13 (1933); Lundblad v. Erickson, 1S0 Minn. 185, 230 N. W.
473 (1930).
18. Bias and prejudice are not inferable from the mere exeivene-ns of the verdict, but
must be shown by other evidence. Cook v. Globe Printing Co., 227 Mlo. 471, 127 S. W.
332 (1910) (verdict for $150,000 reduced to $50,000 by trial court held not to indicate bias
and prejudice); Henderson v. Dreyfus, 26 N. M. 541, 191 Pac. 442 (1919); From-on &
Davis Co. v. Reider, 127 Ohio St. 564, 189 N. E. 851 (1934); Elegand v. Standard Coal
Co., 50 Utah 585, 168 Pac. 266 (1917).
19. Minneapolis, St. Paul & Sault Ste. larie Ry. Co. v. Mloquin, 283 U. S. 520 (19,1),;
Southern Pacific Co. v. Fitchett, 9 Ariz. 128, 80 Pac. 359 (1905); Tunnel ining
& Leasing Co. v. Cooper, 50 Colo. 390, 115 Pac. 901 (1911); Wabash Ry. Co. v. Billing,
212 Il. 37, 72 N. E. 2 (1904); Cain v. Osler, 168 Iowa 59, 150 N. W. 17 (1914); Leinbach
v. Pickwick Greyhound Lines, 135 Kan. 40, 10 P. (2d) 33 (1932); Blessing v. Angel, 65
Mont. 482, 214 Pac. 71 (1923); Carpenter v. Dickey, 26 N. D. 176, 143 N. W. 964 (1913).
20. Reeves v. Catignani, 157 Tenn. 173, 7 S. W. (2d) 38 (1928); Brown v. Southern
Pacific Ry. Co., 7 Utah 288, 26 Pac. 579 (1891); Matsuda v. Hammond, 77 Wash. 120,
137 Pac. 328 (1913); Beach v. Bird & Wells Lumber Co., 135 Wis. 550, 553, 116 N. W.
245, 248 (1908).
21. Hart v. Farris, 218 Cal. 69, 21 P. (2d) 432 (1933); Pulsifer v. City of Albany,
47 S. W. (2d) 233 (Mo. 1931); Kurpgeweit v. Kirby, 83 Neb. 72, 129 N. W. 177 (1910);
Halverson v. Zimmerman, 56 N. D. 607, 218 N. W. 862 (1928); Goodyear Tire & Rubber
Co. v. Marhofer, 38 Ohio App. 143, 176 N. E. 120 (1930); Miller v. Tennis, 140 0kla. 185,
282 Pac. 345 (1929); Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Hicks, 253 S. W. 565 (Tex. 1923).
But cf. Burdict v. Mlissouri Pacific Ry. Co., 123 Mlo. 221, 27 S. W. 453 (1894) and Chez-
ter Park Co. v. Schulte, 120 Ohio St. 273, 166 N. E. 186 (1929), cited note 3, suprj.
See Note (1933) 18 IOWA L. R!v. 561.
This rule is sometimes codified by statute. See N. D. Commp. L.%ws Am. (Supp. 1925)




usefulness of the device is restricted by the frequently reiterated doctrine that
if the damages are excessive, but errors are committed in the course of the trial,
a new trial must be granted as a matter of right.22 However, there seems to be
an increasing tendency to except from this rule such errors as improper admis-
sion of evidence,23 submission of issues unsupported by evidence, 24 errors in
instructions, 25 or misconduct of the jury.26
Where the verdict is inadequate rather than excessive, the scope of judicial
interference has been more limited. The usual remedy is the setting aside of
the verdict and the ordering of a new trial.27 In many states this may be granted
on the ground of mere inadequacy; 2 3 in some, only where the smallness of
the award indicates bias and prejudice;2 in still others, statutes forbid new
trials for inadequacy in actions for injuries to the person or reputation.80
If a new trial is permissible, a needless retrial of all the issues may be avoided,
when the sole objection is to the amount of damages, by limiting it to the issue
22. Improper admission of evidence: Silver King of Arizona Mining Co. v. Kendall, 23
Ariz. 39, 201 Pac. 102 (1921); Foley v. Union House Furnishing Co., 60 S. W. (2d) 725
(Mo. 1933). Submission of issues unwarranted by evidence: Kimmie v. Terminal Rr. A.s'n
of St. Louis, 66 S. W. (2d) 561 (Mo. 1933); Holmes v. Jones, 121 N. Y. 461, 24 N. E. 701
(1890). Incorrect instruction: Smothers v. Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific Ry. Co., IS
S. W. (2d) 884 (Mo. 1929); Texas Cities Gas Co. v. Ellis, 63 S. W. (2d) 717 (Tex. 1933).
23. Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific Ry. Co. v. Batsel, 100 Ark. 526, 140 S. W. 726
(1911); Martin v. Pacific Gas & Electric Co., 255 Pac. 284 (Cal. 1927); Simmons v. Wl-
Kin, 80 Utah 362, 15 P. (2d) 321 (1932). But see note 22, supra.
24. Volay v. Williams, 258 Mich. 184, 241 N. W. 846 (1932).
25. Union Traction Co. v. Cameron, 85 Ind. App. 629, 155 N. E. 265 (1927); Weaver
v. People's Motor Coach Co., 237 Mich. 274, 211 N. W. 625 (1927); Price v. Cercllco, 139
AtI. 660 (N. J. 1927); Findel v. Chester, 169 Wash. 151, 13 P. (2d) 442 (1932); Bump v.
Voights, 212 Wis. 256, 249 N. W. 508 (1933).
26. Bilbo v. Lewis, 45 S. V. (2d) 653 (Tex. 1931).
27. See (1929) 15 VA. L. REv. 592.
28. Peri v. Culley, 119 Cal. App. 117, 6 P. (2d) 86 (1931); De Moss v. Brown Cab
Co., 254 N. W. 17 (Iowa 1934); Simmons v. Fish, 210 Mass. 563, 97 N. E. 102 (1912);
Stegner v. Missouri-Kansas-Texas Rr. Co., 64 S. W. (2d) 691 (Mo. 1933); Degnan v.
Ranchod, 154 AtI. 528 (N. J. 1931); Daigle v. Rudebeck, 154 Wash. 536, 282 Pac. 827
(1929).
To the same effect are the following statutes: ALA. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1928) § 9518(4);
MASS. GEN. LAWS (1932) c. 231, § 128; TEx. ANN. Civ. STAT. (Vernon, 1925) art. 2235;
VA. CODE (Michie, 1930) § 6260; W. VA. CODE (1932) § 56-6-28.
29. Jackson v. Roddy, 224 Ala. 132, 139 So. 354 (1932); Anglin v. City of Columbus,
128 Ga. 469, 57 S. E. 780 (1907); Conroy v. Reid, 168 Atl. 215 (Me. 1933); Jenkins v.
Hankins, 98 Tenn. 545, 41 S. W. 1028 (1897).
See also ARiz. REV. CODE ANN. (Struckmeyer, 1928) § 3847(5); KAN. REv. STAT. ANN.
(1923) § 60-3001(3); MINN. STAT. (Mason, 1927) § 9325(5); WASu. REV. STAT. ANN.
(Remington, 1932) § 399(5).
30. ARK. DIG. STAT. (Crawford & Moses, 1919) § 1312; IND. STAT. ANN. (Burns, 1926)
§ 611; OKLA. STAT. (1931) § 399.
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of damages, a procedure frequently authorized by decision31 or statute.3 2 But
even here a new trial may be denied when the verdict is so inadequate as to indi-
cate that the jury concluded that the defendant was not liable but compro-
mised by allowing nominal damages in order that costs might not be taxed
against the plaintiff.33
Partial new trials and denial of new trials are, however, unsatisfactory solu-
tions to the problem of expediting judicial administration and at the same time
correcting inadequate verdicts. In a recent case, a federal district court
adopted a procedure which seems satisfactorily to accomplish both ends. The
plaintiff instituted a common law action for personal injuries; the jury found
the defendant liable but awarded a verdict for only $500. In ruling on
plaintiff's motion for a new trial on the ground of inadequacy of damages, the
trial court ordered that the motion be granted unless defendant stipulated to
an increase in damages of $1000 over the amount of the verdict. Defendant
consented to the increase and a new trial was denied. On appeal by the plaintiff,
the circuit court of appeals held the course pursued by the district court uncon-
stitutional.34 It reasoned that such action was unsupported by precedent and
constituted, therefore, a re-examination, in a manner unknown at common law,
of a fact tried by a jury, within the language of the Seventh Amendment."'
Even on the limited ground that no common law precedent existed for such
a re-examination, the court's conclusion seems questionable. Such an order,
which by analogy may be termed an additur, was entered in an English case
decided in 1843;33 dicta in modern cases3 7 and references by an early text-
writer3 8 indicate that the practise was not unknown in English common law,
which is the "common law" of the Seventh Amendment.3 9 But apart from the
31. Gasoline Products Co. v. Champlin Refining Co. 283 U. S. 494 (1931) (partial new
trials held constitutional); Mathewson v. Colpitts, 18 N. E. 601 (Mass. 1933); Bu.-e v.
White, 287 S. W. 600 (Mo. 1926); Lisbon v. Lyman, 49 N. H. 553 (1870); Robinson v.
Payne, 99 N. J. Law 135, 122 At. 882 (1923); Howell v. Murdock, 156 Va. 669, 158 S. E.
886 (1931). Contra: McKeon v. Central Stamping Co., 264 Fed. 3S5 (C. C. A. 3rd, 1920);
Krummen Motor Bus & Taxi Co. v. Mechanics' Lumber Co., 175 Ark. 750, 30D S. W. 389
(1927). Cf. cases cited note 17, supra, granting partial new trials for excesaive damages.
See Note (1920) 34 HARv. L. REv. 71.
32. ARIz. REv. CODE (Struckmeyer, 1928) § 3852; Coinz. Gaxu. STAT. (1930) § 5695;
FLA. Comp. GEm. LAws ANN. (1927) § 4640; ILL. REv. STAr. (Smith-Hurd, 1933) c. 110,
§ 216 (1) (f); KAN. REv. STAr. ANN. (1923) § 60-3004; AID. Axis. CoDE (Bagby, 1924)
art. 5, § 25; MAss. GFx. LAws (1932) c. 231, § 128; Wyo. REv. STra. (1931) § 89-4503.
33. Fairmount Glass Works v. Cub Fork Coal Co., 287 U. S. 474 (1932); Donnatin v.
Union Hardware & Metal Co., 38 Cal. App. 8, 175 Pac. 26 (1918); Johnson v. Franklin,
112 Conn. 228, 152 At. 64 (1930); Rubinson v. Des Moines City Ry. Co., 191 Iowa 692,
182 N. W. 865 (1921); Mad v. St. Luke's Hospital Ass'n, 122 Minn. 444, 142 N. W. 705
(1913); Snyder v. Portland Ry, Light & Power Co., 107 Ore. 673, 215 Pac. 887 (1923).
34. Schiedt v. Dimick, 70 F. (2d) 558 (C. C. A. 1st, 1934).
35. For the text of the Seventh Amendment, see note 9, supra.
36. Armytage v. Haley, 4 Q. B 917 (1843). A rule was obtained to show cause why a
new trial should not be had unless defendant would consent to an increase in damages.
37. See Belt v. Lawes 12 Q. B. D. 356, 358 (1884) and cases cited note 49, infra.
38. Bummae's Nisi Pp-us (1806) 21.
39. Capital Traction Co. v. Hof, 174 U. S. 1, 8 (1899).
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question of authority for the use of additurs, the court was confronted with
abundant precedent 4o for the seemingly analogous practise of granting remit-
titurs and as a result was compelled to distinguish the consequences of additurs
and remittiturs. The majority of the court argued that in the case of a remit-
titur the jury, although awarding an erroneously excessive verdict, in so doing
has passed on the amount to which the damages are reduced, while in an addi-
tur, no jury has ever approved the increased amount. Therefore, the plaintiff
is said to be deprived of a jury trial on the question of damages, even though
he recovers more than the allowance of the jury.41  In drawing this technical
distinction, the decision seems in conflict with the purpose of the Seventh
Amendment. This purpose the Supreme Court has repeatedly declared to be
the preservation of the substance of trial by jury, not the traditional forms of
procedure.42 Viewed in the light of that purpose the distinction is plainly
without basis. In the case of remittitur, the damages which the defendant
must pay are reduced to an amount smaller than that found by the jury; in
the case of an additur, the plaintiff recovers damages larger than the amount
deemed by the jury to be reasonable. In neither case is the quantum of recov-
ery fixed by the jury retained. Hence, if a remittitur is not regarded as a sub-
stantial deprivation of trial by jury on the question of damages, an additur
cannot realistically be so regarded.43 Moreover, it is difficult to perceive how
the plaintiff's interests are prejudiced to any greater degree by an additur than
are the defendant's by a remittitur; the loss occasioned by denial of the chance
of securing a more favorable verdict from a second jury on retrial is the same in
either case.
In view of the tenuous ground on which the decision rests, other federal courts
may refuse to follow the holding of the circuit court of appeals, especially
since the allowance of additurs will "advance the cause of justice, end litigation
and lessen the expense," as the majority opinion conceded. 4 4 However, even if
the view that additurs are unconstitutional eventually prevails in the federal
courts, this rule will not be binding on the state courts, which are not con-
trolled by the Seventh Amendment to the Federal Constitution.45  Further-
more, the provisions of state constitutions offer no bar to the allowance of addi-
turs by state courts. The principal objection to the validity of additurs in the
federal courts is interposed by the clause of the Seventh Amendment which
states that "no fact tried by the jury shall be otherwise re-examined . . . than
40. See cases cited notes 2, 3, 4, and 8, supra.
41. Schiedt v. Dinick, 70 F. (2d) 558, 561, 562 (C. C. A. 1st, 1934).
42. Walker v. New Mexico & Southern Pacific Rr. Co., 165 U. S. 593, 596 (1897); Gaso-
line Products Co. v. Champlin Refining Co., 283 U. S. 494, 498 (1931). In the latter caso,
the Supreme Court sustained the constitutionality of granting partial new trials, even
though no such practise existed at common law, on the ground that "the Seventh Amend-
ment does not exact the retention of old forms of procedure." This reasoning would seem
equally applicable to the instant case.
43. See dissenting opinion of Morton, J., in Schiedt v. Dimick, 70 F. (2d) 558 (C. C.
A. 1st, 1934).
44. Cf. Gasoline Products Co. v. Champlin Refining Co., 283 U. S. 494 (1931) and
note 42, supra.
45. Walker v. Sauvinet, 92 U. S. 90 (1876); Pearson v. Yewdall, 95 U. S. 294 (1877).
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according to the rules of the common law." Most state constitutions do not
contain this or any similar clause, but merely provide that the right of trial by
jury shall remain inviolate. 46 Thus the state courts are relieved from the nec-
essity of determining whether or not an additur is a method of re-examination
of a fact tried by a jury unknown at common law. It is this difference in the
language of the federal and state constitutions which has enabled many state
courts to render judgments non obstante veredicto when a directed verdict has
been improperly refused below,4 7 although this procedure has been outlawed
in the federal courts under the Seventh Amendment. 48
Nevertheless, few state courts have availed themselves of the opportunity to
grant additurs, notwithstanding the apparent absence of constitutional barriers
against their use.49 And in some of the scattered jurisdictions where additurs
are allowed, they are utilized only to correct the omission of specific calculable
items of damage80 One state, however, has adopted a method of dealing with
inadequate verdicts that seems very desirable. Under the Wisconsin practise,
a new trial will be ordered unless plaintiff consents to take judgment for the
46. See note 10, supra. However, re-examination clauses similar to that of the senenth
amendment are found in ORE. CONST. art. 1, § 17; W. VA. CoNsr. art. 3, § 13.
47. Wayland v. Latham, 89 Cal. App. 55, 264 Pac. 766 (1928); Bothwell v. Boton
Elevated Ry. Co., 215 Mass. 467, 102 N. E. 665 (1913) ; Vandenburg v. Kaat, 252 Mich. 187,
233 N. W. 220 (1930); Kernan v. St. Paul City Ry. Co., 64 Blinn. 312, 67 N. W. 71 (1896);
Gulf & Ship Island Rr. Co. v. Hales, 140 M iss. 829, 105 So. 458 (1925) ; Roe v. Standard
Furniture Co., 41 Wash. 546, 83 Pac. 1109 (1906). Judgments non obstante veredicto are
often authorized by statute: IDAHo CoDE Anw. (1932) § 7-602(8); IiL. Rnv. STAT. (Smith-
Hurd, 1933) c. 110, § 192; MAss. Gmx. LAws (1932) c. 231, §§ 122, 123; MIci. Compi.
LAWS (1929) §§ 14531, 14532; MnmN. STAT. (Mason, 1927) § 9495; Omo Gra;. CoDE (Page,
1931) § 11601; PA. STAT. Axx. (Purdon, 1930) tit. 12, §§ 681, 686.
48. Slocum v. N. Y. Life Insurance Co., 228 U. S. 364 (1913); Young v. Central Rr.
of N. J., 232 U. S. 602 (1914); See Comment (1929) 38 YALE L. J. 971.
49. Gaffney v. Illingsworth, 90 N. J. Law 490, 101 At. 243 (1917) and Clausing v.
Kershaw, 129 Wash. 67, 224 Pac. 573 (1924) appear to be the only cases squarely uphold-
ing the validity of additurs as a method of correcting generally inadequate verdicts. Cf.
Morrell v. Gobeil, 84 N. H. 150, 147 Ati. 413 (1929) (trial court ordered new trial unless
defendant consented to increase. Defendant refused; verdict set aside. On appeal, judgment
reversed because verdict not inadequate. Validity of additur apparently assumed); s e
Larkins v. Ohio Electric Ry. Co., 4 Ohio App. 37, 44 (1914) (dictum that additur propar
when damages not speculative); American Ry. Express Co. v. Bender, 20 Ohio App. 436,
441, 152 N. E. 197, 198 (1926) (implication that additur with consent of defendant is par-
niissible).
50. Adamson v. County of Los Angeles, 52 Cal. App. 125, 198 Pac. 52 (1921); Carr v.
Miner, 42 Il. 179 (1866); James v. Morey, 44 Il. 352 (1867); E. Tris Napier Co. v. Gloss,
150 Ga. 561, 104 S. E. 230 (1920); Clark v. Henshaw Motor Co., 246 Mass. 336, 140 N. E.
593 (1923).
In cases of omission of calculable items, a few appellate courts increase damages to con-
form to the evidence, even without the consent of defendant. Carroll Oil & Gas Co. v.
Johnson, 229 Ky. 574, 17 S. W. (2d) 717 (1929); Stagg v. Broadway Garage Co., 87
Mont. 254, 286 Pac. 415 (1930). In Louisiana, which has no constitutional guaranty of
jury trial, the courts increase any unreasonably inadequate verdict. York v. Starns, 14
La. App. 548, 129 So. 226 (1930).
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least,51 or defendant consents to judgment for the greatest 5 2 sum an impartial
jury reasonably could award.53  Thus, either party is enabled to prevent a new
trial for inadequacy. 53 It has been asserted that this method may be ineffec-
tive, since each party will prefer to take the risk of a new trial rather than the
alternative offered. 54  But it seems probable that one of the parties would be
sufficiently cognizant of the delay and increased costs of a new trial to accept
the option tendered by the court and thus terminate litigation.
STATE TAXATION AND REGULATION OF THE
TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY
By the passage of the Boulder Canyon Project Act' in 1928 the federal
government took its first step into another field of private industry, the electric
power business, and thus after a long and bitterly contested struggle, openly
launched a new national power policy.2  On May 18, 1933 the government set
out on the second phase of this program by the creation of the Tennessee Valley
Authority3 as a government owned corporation to take over and operate the
properties of the United States at Muscle Shoals 4 A far-sighted experimental
51. Risch v. Lawhead, 211 Wis. 270, 248 N. W. 127 (1933).
52. Reuter v. Hickman, Lauson & Diener Co., 160 Wis. 284, 151 N. W. 795 (1915).
53. A similar procedure is followed in the case of excessive damages. See Campbell v.
Sutliff, 193 Wis. 370, 214 N. W. 374 (1927) for description and policy of the Wisconsin
method.
54. Note (1933) 18 IowA L. REV. 404.
The constitutionality of the Tennessee Valley Authority Act and the legality of the
operations of the Authority under it are assumed throughout this comment [see Comment
(1934) 43 YALE L. J. 815] ; otherwise the problems of state taxation and regulation would
appear to be moot. But compare the recent statement of Judge Grubb in Ashwander v.
Tennessee Valley Authority, U. S. D. C., N. D. Ala., Nov. 28, 1934, denying a motion to
dismiss a bill against the Authority based on unconstitutionality of the Act and illegality
of the Authority's activities: "If the Tennessee Valley Authority, within this state, is
engaging in a proprietary venture, unrelated to any power conferred upon it or on Itg
principal by the constitution, then it is doing an unauthorized thing. Engaging in the
business of producing and selling electric power, as a utility . . . it would become subject
to state regulation . . . " Quaere, whether in such a case the TVA could continue to
operate as a utility.
1. 45 STAT. 1057 (1928), 43 U. S. C. A. § 617 (Supp. 1933).
2. The Secretary of the Interior was directed to make long term contracts for the sale
of the entire estimated output at the switchboard before the work was begun. Only slight
control was to be exercised beyond that point. Cf. THE HoovEr DAm CoNTRAcTS, U. S
Government Printing Office (1933).
3. Tennessee Valley Authority Act, P. L. No. 17, 73rd Cong., 1st Sess. (1933), 16 U. S.
C. A. Supp. § 831 (1933).
4. These consist of the Wilson Dam and two nitrate plants, together with all real estate,
buildings, machinery, and other accessories, and are entrusted to the corporation for the
purposes of this act as agent of the United States.
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program of regional planning was entrusted to the Authority, the principal objec-
tives in the field of power development being to popularize the use of electricity
by the sale of cheap power, and to provide a "yardstick" with which to compare
the relative advantages of private and public ownership and operation.0 Since
then a number of other federal power projects have been begun, the most
important being the Grand Coulee and Bonneville dams on the Columbia River,
and the Fort Peck Dam on the upper Missouri.( Plans for a huge project
on the St. Lawrence River are awaiting the negotiation of a treaty with Cana-
da.' It has been estimated that the national government is proposing to spend
over a billion dollars on federal power projects within the next decade and that
three hundred million dollars has been spent or contracted for already." These
new sources will add enormously to the present capacity, which is already in
excess of present needs; 7 and President Roosevelt has stated that the national
government shall be the perpetual owner.8 Although no definite plans have
been made public with regard to the method which the government intends to
pursue in the distribution of this enormous amount of power, there are a num-
ber of indications that a program similar to that developed in the Tennessee
valley will be followed in the development of the newer projects.0 The novel
5. See Lilienthal, Business and Government in the Tennessee Valley, TVA Press Release,
Jan. 6, 1934, at 3, and Address of Lienthal, TVA Press Release, April 25, 1934, at 3.
6. See Federal Funds for Power, ELrcTRicAL Wonr.D, Sept. 29, 1934, at 32, and The
Facts about The Billion Dollar Water Power Development of the Federal Government,
(pamphlet) National Coal Association, August, 1934. The TVA is at present building two
more large dams, the Norris Dam on the Clinch River and the Wheeler Dam, estimated
to cost $34,000,000 and $20,000,000 respectively, and is doing preliminary work on four
smaller run of the river dams. TVA Press Release, May 18, 1934.
7. SUR=vEa or =E GEA!T LAKEs-ST. LAwRENcE SEAwAv A PoWER PRojT=c, (U. S.
Government Printing Office 1934). President Roosevelt speaks of a fourth yardstick and
plans to lay a treaty before the Senate this winter differing in some respects from that
rejected last year. U. S. News, Oct. 8, 1934, at 14, col. 7.
8. Speech at Bonneville Dam, Aug. 1934, ELrcmc.AL Wor.n, Aug. 11, 1934, at 187.
The TVA has no authority to sell or otherwise dispose of real property. Tennessee Valley
Authority Act, supra note 3.
9. In his message transmitting the Tennessee Valley Authority Act to Congres the
President stated that if this program was successful it could be utilized in a like develop-
ment of other projects. 77 CONG. REc. 1423 (1933). He has indicated recently that a
wide expansion of the plan is contemplated. N. Y. Times, Oct. 17, 1934, at 18, co. 5;
N. Y. Times, Nov. 19, 1934, at 3, col. 1. Also a number of bills were introduced during
the last session of Congress, contemplating similar developments in other areas. 78 Co:c.
Rkc. 25 (1934), H. R. 6224 by Mr. Hastings, proposing the creation of the Arkansas
Valley Authority; 78 CoNG. R c. 56 (1934), S. 1973 by Mr. Norris, proposing a similar
development of the Missouri and A elppi Valleys; 78 Coxo. Rc. 133 (1934), H. R.
6368 by Mr. Marand, concerning the development of the Arkansas River; 78 Co.o. REc.
9067 (1934), H. R. 9669 by Mr. Greenwood concerning the development of the Wabash and
White Rivers. Senator Dill of Washington is apparently backing the creation similarly
of a Columbia Valley Authority to operate the Bonneville and Grand Coulee Dams (cf
Naw OUTLoox, July, 1934, at 48-52) and proponents of the St. Lawrence project are
asking for a federal corporation on the lines of the TVA to take charge of it. U. S. News,
Oct. 8, at 664, col. 7. The first example of this type of administrative device was created
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problems which confront the Tennessee Valley Authority and the legal ques-
tions raised by its operation are thus representative of those which must be
faced by the United States government in its ambitious program of developing
under government ownership and control the power resources of the nation.
The TVA is, in the words of the President, a "corporation clothed with the
power of government, but possessed of the flexibility and initiative of a private
enterprise."'1  Its entire stock is owned by the United States, and it is con-
trolled by a board of three members with large discretionary powers. Aside
from the ordinary corporate powers, including that of suing and being sued, it
may exercise the power of eminent domain in the name of the United States,
is to have access to the patent office for the purpose of using new inventions,
the cooperation of the departments of the federal government, and the franking
privilege. It is directed to acquire or build facilities for the generation, trans-
mission, and sale of electric power at as low rates as possible and with the
object of extending its use; to give preference to states, counties, municipalities,
and cooperative organizations over private companies; and to insert in con-
tracts at wholesale a provision that the consumer rates shall be satisfactory
to it. Armed with these powers the Authority has successfully set up an area
in which to carry on its operations in the power industry. In response to the
requests of two hundred municipalities for cheap TVA power, the Authority
has contracted for the purchase of all the electric properties of several private
utilities within a large area the size of which was in large measure determined
by the amount of the available power produced at the Wilson Dam. These
contracts provide for non-competitive territorial agreements and for interchange
agreements, and are to terminate upon completion of the Norris Dam or at the
end of five years, whichever occurs first."' The TVA rate schedule, which
ranges from 40% to 60% lower than the rates heretofore charged by the
private companies,'1 2 is expected to induce sufficient increase in the use of elec-
tricity to result in a profit. To further stimulate this necessary increase, another
corporation, the Electric Home and Farm Authority, a subsidiary of the TVA
with the same directors, was created by executive order to organize and carry
out an intensive sales campaign of cheap electric appliances on easy credit
terms.13
This ambitious program raises practical issues of the first importance. If
the Authority is to be exempt from taxation by states and local bodies 14 and
in New York state in 1931, and the TVA is closely analogous to it in almost all respects.
See N. Y. Laws 1931, c. 772. The creation of such agencies to take charge of the new
federal projects seems quite probable, for it is doubtful whether the method followed at
Boulder Dam of contracting for the sale of power at the dam would be satisfactory because
of present surplus capacity in these relatively thinly populated areas.
10. Message to Congress, supra, note 9.
11. TVA Press Releases, Jan. 5, 1934, and July 17, 1934.
12. TVA Press Releases, July 17, 1934, and June 3, 1934. For the contract between the
TVA and the city of Tupelo, Miss., for the sale of power, see TVA Press Release Nov.
7, 1933.
13. Lilienthal, Business and Government in the Tennessee Valley, TVA Press Releaso,
Jan. 6, 1934.
14. Such a result may be reached under the general doctrine that the states may not
tax the agents or instrumentalities of the federal government. See notes 59-64, infra.
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if it should insist upon the enjoyment of that exemption, the consequent with-
drawal of large amounts of formerly taxable real estate and other property,
would cause sharp reductions in governmental revenues; for the Authority
is taking over large areas for flowage purposes and dams, and considerably
more for towns, roads, fertilizer plants, and electrical facilities. Moreover,
the revenue formerly produced by taxing the private electric utilities will be
reduced insofar as the Authority invades the field. As a result of these reduc-
tions in the tax base, a greater share of the tax burden would necessarily be
placed upon the remaining subjects, among them the Authority's privately-
owned competitors. Yet these competitors, including the electric utilities, fer-
tilizer companies, and coal, gas and ice companies, will doubtless find that
their ability to carry any extra tax burden is greatly impaired by the compe-
tition of the TVA. Indeed, to exempt the Authority from state taxation would
provide an insurmountable competitive advantage, of which it could avail itself;
whereas to subject it to such taxation would merely be to force it to
share the burden of the cost of the facilities and protection which the state
affords to all. Subjection to state taxation would, moreover, be necessary if
the TVA is truly to perform a "yardstick" function. On the other hand such
a subjection might well open the door to subtle discriminations against the
Authority's operations and properties.0 And although a hostile state or county
could not constitutionally tax the Authority out of existence or openly dis-
criminate against it,'0 the various tax policies might well hamper and burden
certain activities to such an extent as to impair the ability of the Authority to
carry out its program. Furthermore, if the Authority is unable to finance itself
and is supplied with federal funds, such taxation would increase the burden of
the federal taxpayers.
The issues thus raised regarding taxation of the Authority arise in even
more complex and pressing form with respect to the power of the states, through
their public service commissions, to regulate and control the utility operations
of the Authority. The commissions of both Alabama and Tennessee have
recently attempted to exercise jurisdiction over the TVA. At a hearing before
the Alabama Public Service Commission, held for the purpose of passing on
the sale of utility properties of the Alabama Power Company to the Authority,
intervening coal and ice companies opposed the legality of the transfer on the
ground that the Authority had not obtained a certificate of convenience and
necessity and had not qualified under Alabama law. The Commission in
approving the transaction found that the Authority was operating a public
utility, and held that, although a federal agency, it was exercising "proprietary"
as opposed to "governmental" functions, and as such was subject to the laws
of Alabama and the regulations of the commission. The Authority was then
ordered to file rate and service schedules and otherwise to comply with Alabama
law.1 7 And recently the Tennessee Railroad and Public Utility Commission
15. Local property assesments are notoriously unequal.
16. The due process and equal protection clauses of the Constitution would be sufficient
protection against such taxes.
17. Re Alabama Power Co. 4 P. U. R. (N. S.) 233 (1934). On June 1, 1934, the
Commission approved the sale of the properties of the Alabama Power Co. to the TVA
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approved the sale of Knoxville properties of the Tennessee Electric Company
to the Authority, explicitly reserving its jurisdiction over the Authority.18
During the hearing the Commission issued a subpoena to Director Lilienthal.
He refused to comply, however, and appearing voluntarily the next day stated
that the Authority could not constitutionally submit to the jurisdiction of the
state commission.' 8 This same position was taken in a letter from Mr. Lilien-
thai to the Alabama commission.17
Such withdrawal from state jurisdiction of the properties purchased and
operated by the Authority could have a severe reaction on the entire system of
state commission control. For the sale to the Authority, forced by threat of
direct competition, of all of a private utility's properties within certain areas
might well leave the utility with a system which a reduced volume of business
without a like reduction in generating capacity and overhead had rendered
inefficient and unprofitable. Moreover, upon completion of the dams now
under construction the Authority plans to extend its operations beyond its
presenf territory, and thus may come into direct competition with private
power companies. In such an event the latter may insist that they be per-
mitted to lower their rates below cost in the competitive areas,10 and perhaps
also to raise their charges proportionately in the rest of the state. Thus in
many ways the Authority's activities may impair the state commission's ability
as specified in the contract of Jan. 4 (see note 11, supra) without raising the question of
jurisdiction. 4 P. U. R. (N. S.) 225 (1934). On rehearing sought by intervening coal
and ice companies the contracts were again approved in the above order. This decision
was appealed by both interveners and the Alabama Power Co., and on September 4th
was reversed and sent back for rehearing on the ground that due notice of the original
hearing had not been given to interested parties in accordance with the statute. Pumrae
UTLrETIS FORThIOHTLY, September 27, 1934, at 432. Later when the Commission was
considering a motion to subpoena the directors of the TVA, Mr. Lilienthal wrote them a
letter denying the jurisdiction of the commission but expressing a wish to cooperate. In
consenting to appear voluntarily he made the stipulation that: "Neither directly nor indi-
rectly will our participation be construed as consent to your jurisdiction to regulate or
control the TVA." U. S. News, Oct. 22, 1934, at 698, col. 7.
18. N. Y. Times, Oct. 10, 1934, at 6, col. 6, and Oct. 11, 1934, at 35, col. 6. The order
stated that the approval should "not be treated as conceding or yielding to the Tennessee
Valley Authority or to the Federal Government any of the rights, powers, jurisdiction
or authority of the State as the sovereign over the properties involved." N. Y. Times,
Oct. 27, 1934, at 21, col. 1. See In re Tennessee Electric Power Co., 2 P. U. R. (N. S.)
4 (1934), in which the commission approved the contract of sale of Jan, 4, 1934, (see note
11, supra) with the same reservations. An attempt by interveners to hold up the Knoxville
transfer until the constitutionality of the TVA could be settled was successful, and pre-
vented the transfer of the properties on October 31, which was the final date set In the
contract. Thus the entire deal has been called off and Knoxville is now proceeding with
its plan of building its own distributing system under a $2,600,000 loan and grant from
the PWA, and of selling TVA power in direct competition with the Tenne see Public
Service Company. N. Y. Times, Nov. 3, 1934, at 21, col. 7.
19. A somewhat similar situation was presented to the Ohio Public Utilities Commis.
sion recently when the private utility serving the town of Oberlin sought the Commission's
approval of a reduction in its rates of nearly 50% in order to allow it to compete with
a new municipal plant which apparently was not under the commission's control. This
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to assure consumers all over the state of adequate service at reasonable rates
and to assure the utilities of a fair return on their investments. And finally,
individual citizens, organizations and municipalities in areas served only by
the Authority would have no recourse to an impartial body in case of claims
of discriminations, disagreements as to rates or services, or extensions of new
lines, unless the state commissions may have jurisdiction; for resort to the
courts is a remedy beyond the means of most.20
But there are weighty reasons for exempting the Authority from the juris-
diction of the state commissions.21  Even if the TVA were not required to
secure a certificate of convenience and necessity - 2 the commissions would
have extensive control over all its operations, with disastrous consequences for
the Authority. Under state laws the commissions could refuse to approve of
purchases, leases and extensions; could prescribe rates and terms of service;
could exercise control over accounting practices, security, and reserves;
could examine the records and the properties, and inquire into the management;
and could charge inspection and supervision fees.P This control would be
exercised by each state in which the Authority was able to operate with regu-
lations varying from state to state according to the policy of its commission.
Each commission would undoubtedly be subjected to strong pressure by the
power interests and perhaps from political sources, and might even be given
a mandate by the state legislature respecting the state's policy toward the
rate reduction was refused on the ground that it would result in operation below cost.
PUBLIC UrurxEs FOR mInTY, Oct. 11, 1934, at 493. Later a reduction to the level
charged by the municipal plant was permitted. PUBLIC UTLTIs Fonrmmr=, Y, Oct. 2 ,
1934, at 546. See Comment (1933) 43 YALE L. J. 114. This same situation may aris2
if Knoxville proceeds to build and operate its own plant in competition with the private
utility. See note 18, supra.
20. This point was stressed by the Alabama commission in its opinion holding the
Authority subject to its jurisdiction. See note 17, supra.
21. The Authority apparently does not claim that the commions have no juri-dic-
tion to interfere with its program indirectly by refusing their approval of contracts of pur-
chase or the terms of such contracts regarding territorial or interchange agreements. But
though it has not yet raised the issue, it may in the future. For considerable power to
block the Authority's program remains in the commissions if they can refuse to allow
state companies to sell their properties to the Authority or to reduce the rates charged
by them in the retailing of TVA power. The federal act contemplates distribution of power
through cooperative organizations also, which the commission could prevent by refusing
to give them certificates of convenience and necessity, or hamper by prescribing their
rates. The Authority apparently relies on its power to build its own system if all other
methods fail, and perhaps with that possibility always present the commissions will approve
its arrangements. The New York Power Authority Act recognizes the difilculties implicit
in the jurisdiction of the regulative over the competitive body, and exempts all activities
of its Authority from the provisions of the public service law and the jurisdiction of the
commission. N. Y. Laws 1931, c. 772, § 18.
22. The Alabama Commission apparently considered the federal act a sufficient certificate
of necessity, and merely ordered the filing of rate schedules and compliance in general
with Alabama law. See note 17, supra.
23. ALA- CODE (1928) §§ 9740-9824, and TEax. CODE (1932) §§ 53S0-5503.
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Authority.2' Such control over the Authority would unquestionably impair its
ability to carry out the purposes of Congress and conceivably might result in
defeating the entire program.
A decision on these problems of inter-governmental relations on realistic
grounds must be based on the position taken on the fundamental issue of
public versus private ownership and control of the power industry, and, if
ihere is to be public ownership, on the issue whether it should be undertaken
by the federal or local governments. If the opponents of public ownership
are correct in their contention that it has proved more costly and inefficient2 5
and that government competition is unprincipled and destructive of our social
system20 it would seem wiser to discourage it. Thus the TVA might be placed
on the same level as private utilities and its detrimental consequences mini-
mized by the exercise of state jurisdiction to tax and regulate. In this way the
Authority's distasteful regulatory function could be limited while at the same
time it is left to work out its "yardstick" rates under the same conditions as
the privately owned utilities. But the climate of opinion seems to be otherwise.
The feeling that the commission system of regulation has been a failure has
gained considerable momentum, and there have been a number of flagrant
examples of its abuse.27 Due in part, perhaps, to this failure, the federal, state,
and local governments have taken over numerous services, and with apparent
success.28 Moreover, the results of experiments in government ownership and
operation of the electric power industry in this country as well as in foreign
nations have been so successful that it may almost be said to be beyond the
24. If a federal corporation on the same lines as the TVA is placed in charge of the
St. Lawrence project as proposed (see note 9, supra), it would come into direct conflict with
the New York Power Authority and the policy of the state, which is expressed in the act
to be that natural resources within the state are "inalienable to, and ownership, possession,
and control thereof, shall always be vested in the people of the state." N. Y. Laws (1931)
c. 772, § 1.
25. See PERsoNs, GovmzmxNT EXPEaMENTATION IN INDUSTRY (1934); Government
Ownership, address by Secretary Hoover, Sept. 24, 1924.
26. This contention is based on the fact that the public organization does not pay taxes
or dividends and may fall back on government funds. In the case of the Authority there
are additional advantages. It may escape the costs imposed by the regulatory bodies; It
enjoys the cooperation of other federal departments and agencies and the backing of
federal credit with its low interest; its mail is franked; it receives cut rates on freight
from the railroads, and its employees are carried at reduced rates; and finally it has the
powerful prestige of the United States behind it. N. Y. Times, Nov. 1, 1934, at 31, col. 3.
N. Y. Herald-Tribune, Editorial, Nov. 1, 1934, at 16, col. 1.
27. For example, see the disclosures concerning Senator Thayer of New York, 138
NATION 400, Apr. 11, 1934; and compare the Insull scandal (1933) 15 WoRLD TowsoRnow
343.
28. Municipalities have undertaken a great variety of services such as supplying water,
gas, and electricity. See THoAusox, PuBIo OwNEzszp (1925) pp. 204-334. States have
owned and operated banks, public elevators, mills and insurance companies. TuomPsoN, op.
cit. supra, at 176-204. The federal government owns and runs various enterprises in connec-
tion with the reclamation service and the public domain; the post office, coast guard, and
weather bureau; the Panama and Alaskan railroads; and the largest printing office In the
world. THompsoN, op. cit. supra, at 20-72.
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experimental stage.2 9 Although there are many examples of public power sys-
tems in the United States, they are for the most part local undertakings car-
ried on on a small scale. The Tennessee Valley experiment, being the first
example of large scale development under federal control, is open to objections
not applicable to the others. It is argued that control should remain in the
hands of local bodies who know local conditions and are responsible to the
people there, and to whom complaints can be made directly instead of through
a mass of red tape surrounding a central organization miles away in Washing-
tion. But if any large scale development of the nation's resources is to b3
undertaken by public bodies the federal government is obviously the most
appropriate agency for the purpose. In addition to its greater resources, its
projects do not have to conform to political boundary lines, and in the de-
velopment of an efficient public super-power network the full utilization of the
distributing area is a practical necessity?0° These considerations lead to the
conclusion that the national program is basically sound, and therefore it
should not be exposed to possible sabotage or interference by local political
groups.
Weight is added to the argument for unfettered federal operation of the
Tennessee valley power project by the reassuring conciliatory policies adopted
by Congress and the Authority with respect to the taxing and regulatory needs
of the states. The Act provides that the Board shall pay to the states of
Alabama and Tennessee annually five per cent of the gross receipts from the
sale of electric power generated in the state.' And the Board has, of its own
accord, adopted a policy of voluntarily paying to local and state governments
an amount which would make its total contribution equal to the taxes it vould
pay if it were a privately owned utility,3 2 and has included in its contracts with
municipalities purchasing their own power plants from it a provision that
29. Municipally owned plants numbered 2318 in 1925, and made up almost 50% of
the plants in the country, though producing only a small portion of the power. The plants
in Cleveland and Seattle have made particularly good showings. Tnr'szo.-, op. cit. supra,
note 28. The federal government has run a number of power projects through the
Reclamation Service and has succeeded in achieving extremely low rates on a basis of Ezrvice
at cost. See Annual Reports of the Reclamation Service. The Ontario Hydroelectric
Power Commission has had extraordinary success. Tnom'so:z, op. cit. supra note 28, at
338-364. The English grid system of transmission lines is publicly owned, as well as two-
thirds of the municipal distributing plants. Chazeau, Electricity Supply in Great Britain,
J. or LA.er sA- PuBric Urnziv= Ecox., Aug. 1934.
30. For an investigation of the possibilities of large scale coordination see A Super-
Power System for the Region Between Boston and Washington, Professional Pap2r 123
(U. S. Geological Survey, Dept. Int. 1921). Such an undertakfing conceivably might ta
developed by a partnership of municipalities, counties, or states, on the lines of the Ontario
system or by contracts similar to the Colorado River Compact, or by mere cooperation.
But the practical diiculties in carrying out any general program by such methods wou!d
be prohibitive.
31. Tennessee Valley Authority Act, supra n6te 3, § 13. The statute alsso provides
that the Board, with the consent of the President, may revise the p2rcentage, but not
more often than once every five years or without allowing a hearing to the states.
32. TVA Press Release, Aug. 23, 1934, at 5; N. Y. Times, Oct. 11, 1934, at 35, col. 6.
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they shall do likewise.as This policy effectively meets the objection that the
revenues of local political bodies will be dangerously reduced by the Authority's
exemption,M and also that the content of the Authority's "yardstick' does not
include this element of private utility costs.8 5 Moreover, the Authority has
shown a willingness to cooperate with the commissions as well. It has pro-
vided data and information requested by the commissions and expressed a desire
to cooperate in attaining the mutual objectives of both governmental bodies.80
And a whole-hearted attempt has been made to eliminate or minimize losses
to private industry resulting from the Authority's operations. It has bought
existing plants wherever possible instead of building competing lines; it has
offered to aid the coal industry in finding new uses for coal; and it has done its
business through existing channels instead of setting up its own agencies to
serve its needs .3 Although it is yet too early to evaluate the success of the
Tennessee valley experiment, its activities thus far and its program set high
standards of responsibility to the public and of cooperation with other public
bodies in the development of the valley.38  These additional practical con-
siderations further strengthen the wisdom of the conclusion that the Authority
should be independent of state control and free to carry out the national pro-
gram without interference.
Established legal principle and precedent, moreover, strongly support this
view. The general rule that the states may not hamper or control the activi-
ties of the national government is too well settled to be questioned, and is based
on the latter's constitutionally declared supremacy. 0 The complete superiority
within its jurisdiction of the federal over the state judiciary is an outstanding
example of this supremacy,40 and of course is the basis for its enforcement in
other fields. Within the scope of federal jurisdiction, as determined by the
federal courts under federal statutes, the powers of the federal courts are
supreme, and their decisions and orders not only are immune from interference
33. See TVA Press Release, April 25, 1934, at 3.
34. Governor Miller of Alabama has agreed that the percentage should be based on
wholesale rates. PuBLIc UTrms FORTNIGHTLY, Aug. 30, 1934, at 285. Tennessee has
already been paid $40,000. U. S. News, Oct. 15, 1934, at 682, col. 1. Apparently no tax
proceeding has been brought against the Authority.
35. See N. Y. Herald Tribune, Editorial, supra note 26.
36. See notes 17, 18, 32, supra; TVA Press Release, Sept. 18, 1934.
37. See TVA Press Release, Aug. 23, 1934, at 1; id. July 18, 1934, and Oct. 15, 1934.
The Electric Home and Farm Authority is promoting the sale of privately manufactured
appliances through existing selling agencies. TVA Press Release, Aug. 1, 1934, at 4.
38. See TVA Press Releases, Aug. 1, 1934, Sept. 20, 1934, Sept. 27, 1934, and Oct. 2, 1934.
39. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U. S. 316 (1819). U. S. CoNsT., Art. VI, § 2. For
detailed treatment see Powell, Indirect Encroachment on Federal Authority by the Taxing
Powers of the States (1918) 31 HARV. L. Ray. 321, 572, 721, 932; Cohen and Dayton,
Federal Taxation of State Activities and State Taxation of Federal Activities (1925) 34
YALE L. J. 807; Brown, State Taxation of Interstate Commerce, and Federal and State
Taxation in Intergovernmental Relations-i930-1932 (1933) 81 U. oF PA. L. REv. 247;
Boudin, The Taxation of Government Instrumentalities (1933-34) 22 GEo. L. J. 1, 256;
Comment (1930) 30 COL. L. REv. 92; Comment (1932) 81 U. oF PA. L. REv. 194.
40. United States v. Judge Peters, 9 U. S. 115 (1809).
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by the state judiciary,4' but when directed to state judges must be obeyed
by them.4 Nor have the state courts power to exercise control over the official
discretion of other officers or employees of the United States. 4 Similarly state
legislatures are forbidden to exert control over the activities and operations
of the national government, for neither the criminal44 nor civil laws45 of the
states may apply to officers and employees of the United States when acting in
the course of their duties, while the federal laws on the other hand, are binding
on the states.46 In the field of taxation, however, a different rule has prevailed
since 1870, namely, that just as the operations of the national government are
exempt from state taxation, similarly the states are exempt from national taxa-
tion.47 The rule was based upon the principle that the state and national gov-
ernments are independent and distinct sovereignties within their respective
spheres and that therefore the two are on a parity as to the concurrent power
41. Ableman v. Booth, 62 U. S. 506 (1858) (writ of habeas corpus issued by a state
court to free a person held in custody under such orders of a federal court held void.)
42. Writs of error, certiorari, and mandamus are commonly issued by the federal courts
to state judges. See e.g., Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U. S. 304 (1816).
43. McClung v. Silliman, 19 U. S. 598 (1821) (state court may not issue mandamus to
an officer in the U. S. land office); Boske v. Comingore, 177 U. S. 459 (190D) (habeas
corpus issued to free United States revenue officer cited for contempt in state court for
failure to produce records which the Secretary of the Treasury had ruled were private):
In re Neill, 17 Fed. Cas. No. 10089, p. 1296 (S. D. N. Y. 1871) (U. S. army officer may not
be committed for contempt by a state court for refusing to produce an enlisted soldier in
response to a writ of habeas corpus) ; Ex parte Shockley, 17 F. (2d) 133 (N. D. Ohio 1926)
(habeas corpus issued to free director of naturalization imprisoned for refusal to obey
mandamus of state court).
44. Tennessee v. Davis, 100 U. S. 257 (1879) (Congress has power to authorize removal
to federal court of a trial of a United States revenue officer for murder under state law);
In re Neagle, 135 U. S. 1 (1890) (habeas corpus issued to free United States martslall
from state custody on indictment for murder); In re Waite, 81 Fed. 359 (N. D. Ia. 1897)
(state blackmail laws inapplicable to federal pension investigator); Ex parte Dickson, 14
F. (2d) 609 (N. D. N. Y. 1926) (imprisonment of United States customs officers on
murder charge held improper interference with operations of federal government).
45. Ohio v. Thomas, 173 U. S. 276 (1899) (habeas corpus issued to free governor of
national soldier's home for issuing oleomargerine in violation of state statute); Johnson v.
Maryland, 254 U. S. 51 (1920) (state cannot require driver's license from driver of United
States mail truck); Hunt v. United States, 278 U. S. 96 (1928) (state game laws inap-
plicable to federal officers acting for the protection of national parks); Ex parte Willman,
277 Fed. 819 (S. D. Ohio 1921) (state cannot imprison mail truck drivers for violating
regulations regarding headlights). In Johnson v. Maryland, supra, Justice Holmes conceded
the general principle that state laws of general application which incidentally affect the
mode of carrying out the employment are valid as to federal officers. But this merely raises
the question of congressional intent, and is not a limitation on the constitutional supremacy
of the national government. See United States v. Hart, 26 Fed. Cas. No. 15,316, p. 193
(C. C. D. Pa., 1817).
46. Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 41 U. S. 539 (1842) (Fugitive Slave Act).
47. Collector v. Day, 78 U. S. 113 (1870). In this case the Supreme Court held that
Congress might not levy a general gross income tax of 55 of any income over $100 on
the salary of a state probate judge, rejecting the principle of the supremacy of the national
government in so many words.
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of taxation.48 Thus the immunity of the federal government based on the
principle of supremacy49 was granted to the states as a necessary implication of
the newly found principle of equality. Although this principle has been often
applied5" and is the basis of extensive exemptions from federal taxation, the
results reached have not been consistent with real equality.r1
In order to escape from the full implications of this principle that state and
federal governments are equal sovereigns in matters of taxation, the courts
adopted a distinction between the "governmental" and "proprietary" functions
of state governments, and limited their immunity from taxation to the former.
This distinction had originated as a limitation on the rule that a municipal
corporation as a division of a state government shares its sovereign immunity
from suits for torts of its agents.5 2  This and a similar principle to the effect
that a state does not impart its sovereign immunity from suit to a corporation
48. As Chief Justice Chase admitted in Veazie Bank v. Fenno, 75 U. S. 533, 547 (1869),
there are certain reserved powers of the states which it is not competent for Congress to
tax, such as the right to pass laws and execute them, because the power to tax involves the
power to destroy. This is a necessary implication from the constitution for the preserva-
tion of these reserved powers, however, and does not necessarily lead to equality of treat-
ment with the federal government. Nor does it gainsay the supremacy of the federal govern-
ment, but is merely another constitutional limitation of it. See the dissent of Justice Brad-
ley in Railroad v. Peniston, 85 U. S. 5, 48 (1873). The reasons for the two rules are differ-
ent also, for the national government being the government of all the people levies
support from all alike, and whether revenue comes from the people directly or through
their delegated agents should make little difference; but state taxation of federal operations
is a levy of support by a part from the whole and cannot be anything but unequal. See
McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U. S. 316, 435 (1819).
49. See notes 59-64, infra.
50. In the following Supreme Court cases a federal tax on a state instrumentality was
held unconstitutional. United States v. Baltimore and Ohio Rr. Co., 84 U, S. 322 (1872)
(income of municipal corporation); Pollock v. Farmer's Loan and Trust Co., 157 U. S.
429 (1895), aff'd on rehearing, 158 U. S. 601 (1895) (income of private persons from bonds
of municipal corporations); Ambrosini v. United States, 187 U. S. 1 (1902) (stamp tax
on bonds given to state by liquor licensee); Indian Motocycle Co. v. United States, 283
U. S. 570 (1930) (motorcycles sold to municipal corporation for police service); Burnet v.
Coronado Oil and Gas Co. 285 U. S. 393 (1932) (profits from oil lease of state school
land). In other cases the rule has been conceded but not applied. Merchants National
Bank v. United States, 101 U. S. 1 (1880) (10% tax on notes of municipal corporations
paid out by banks upheld on ground of supreme national power over currency); Man-
hattan v. Blake, 148 U. S. 412 (1893) (upheld tax on state bank deposits including that
deposited by the state generally, as the bank here was not a disbursing agent); South
Carolina v. United States, 199 U. S. 437 (1905) (tax on state-owned liquor monopoly
upheld on the ground that it was a proprietary function) ; Flint v. Stone Tracy, 220 U. S.
107 (1911) (federal corporation tax upheld as to state corporations); Metcalf and Eddy
v. Mitchell, 269 U. S. 514 (1926) (tax on income of engineer hired by state temporarily
to build sewage plant upheld on ground he was not a state instrumentality).
51. See Boudin, The Taxation of Government Instrumentalities, 22 Gao. L. J. 1, 256
(1933-34).
52. Cf. Borchard, Governmental Responsibility in Tort, 34 YALE L. J. 1, 129, 229, 36
YALE L. J. 1, 757, 1039.
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in which it is sole stockholder M were made use of by the Supreme Court in
South Carolina v. United States54 to support its holding that a state-owned
corporation operating a liquor monopoly was not exempt from a national
general excise tax, with the result that the "governmental-proprietary" distinc-
tion became a limitation on the states' immunity from federal taxation as well.
The states of Alabama and Tennessee are now attempting to extend this prin-
ciple to make it applicable to the federal government as a limitation not only
on its immunity from state taxation, but also on its immunity from state con-
trol and regulation. 0
But there is no sound legal basis for such an extension in either case. The
federal government has no reserved powers under which it may enter into
business as have the states; as a government of limited powers it can constitu-
tionally exercise only governmental functions."7  But even if the term "pro-
prietary" could be defined to fit some of the activities of the federal government,
there is no basis for incorporating the distinction into the rule regarding state
taxation of federal agencies. Its existence in the field of tax law can be ac-
counted for only by the necessity for placing a practical limit on the exemption
of state agencies from federal taxation by the application of the doctrinal
equality rule.53 To carry over a principle which was used for the purpose of
53. Cf. Bank of U. S. v. Planter's Bank, 22 U. S. 904 (1824); Briscoce v. Bank of Ken-
tucky, 36 U. S. 257 (1837); Darrington v. State of Alabama, 54 U. S. 12 (1851).
54. 199 U. S. 437 (190S).
55. The incorporation of this distinction into the principle of state immunity from
taxation was foreshadowed in a number of decisions of the Supreme Court. As far back
as 1869 in the Veazle Bank Case (supra note 48) the term "governmental" was ued as
limiting the nature of exempt functions. Again in United States v. Baltimore and Ohio
Rr. Co. (supra note 50) the distinction was discussed, the court holding that the particular
act was "within the range of municipal duties" and was therefore exempt. Also in Am-
brosini v. United States, 187 U. S. 1 (1902) the formula laid down was that only "strictly
governmental activities" of state governments were within the rule. Since the South Caro-
lina case this has been generally accepted as the formula, and it was expre sly approved
in Flint v. Stone-Tracy, 220 U. S. 107 (1911), and followed in Ohio v. Helvering, 54 Sup.
Ct. 725 (1934) (state liquor monopoly) and State of North Dakota v. OMson, 33 F. (2d)
848 (C. C. A. 8th, 1929), appeal dismissed for lack of jurisdiction, 280 U. S. 528 (1929),
in which the federal Capital Stock Tax was held valid as applied to the State Bank of
North Dakota, a state owned and controlled corporation (1929) 43 Hanv. L. REV. 329.
56. Even though such an extension may be valid in the field of taxation it does not
follow that it is so as to the power to control and regulate, for while the power to tax
is concurrent and may be exercised by both governments at once on the same Eubject,
the power to control and regulate must by its very nature be exclusive.
57. Apparently the only holding on this question is in Alabama v. United States, 33 F.
(2d) 897 (Ct. CL 1930), in which it was held that when the federal government invaded
the field of business enterprise under its constitutional powers, in this case by selling sur-
plus power generated at the Wilson dam, those functions it undertook became immediately
public and "governmental" in nature and could not be taxed. The Supreme Court, with-
out discussing the merits, reversed the decision and dismissed the petition of Alabama for
lack of jurisdiction of the Court of Claims over the issue. 282 U. S. 502 (1931). See
opinion in Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority, U. S. D. C., N. D. Ala., Nov. 28, 1934.
58. See the opinion in South Carolina v. United States, 199 U. S. 437 (1905). S e
notes 50 and 55, supra, for cases bearing on the point.
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sustaining surreptitiously the federal supremacy and to apply it now to deny
that supremacy would seem as anomalous as it would be arbitrary. Nor is there
any support for such an extension in precedent. State taxation of the property 9
obligations 0 and operations 61 of the federal government is prohibited. Excise
taxes on the privileges, occupations, franchises, and operations of federal agen-
des are also prohibited; 62 but taxation of the tangible property of federal agents
has been upheld when the agent was engaged in business for private profit.0 3
Taxation of the property of federally-owned corporations, however, whether
incorporated under state or federal law, has been held invalid. ' These deci-
sions were reached in some cases by disregarding the corporate fiction and in
others by relying on the principle of agency or trust. Thus it was said that
to subject the federal government's property to state taxation simply because
Congress has vested the legal title in a corporation which it created for its own
convenience, in which it holds all the stock, and to which it furnished all the
capital, would be to sacrifice substance to form.0 5 And though it was conceded
that taxation of the property of an agent is not generally taxation of a federal
instrumentality, 66 it was held so here because the sole purpose of the acquisi-
tion of the property was the fulfillment of its duty to the federal govern-
59. Van Brocklin v. Tennessee, 117 U. S. 151 (1886) (land purchased at tax sale);
Baltimore Shipbuilding Co. v. Baltimore, 195 U. S. 375 (1904) (contingent interest In
drydock) ; Lee v. Osceola Improvement District, 268 U. S. 643 (1925) (public lands),
60. Weston v. City Council of Charleston, 27 U. S. 449 (1829) (stocks); Banks v,
Mayor, 74 U. S. 16 (1868) (certificates of indebtedness); Bank v. Supervisors, 74 U, S.
26 (1868) (notes).
61. See McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U. S. 316, 436 (1819).
62. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U. S. 316 (1819); Osborn v. United States Bank, 22
U. S. 738 (1824); Dobbins v. Commissioners of Erie County, 41 U. S. 435 (1842); Call.
fornia v. Central Pacific Rr. Co., 127 U. S. 1 (1888); Flaherty v. Hanson, 215 U. S. 515
1910); Johnson v. Maryland, supra note 45; Federal Land Bank v. Crosland, 261 U. S.
374 (1923).
63. This is true whether the agent was incorporated under state or federal law. Thom-
son v. Union Pacific Rr. Co., 76 U. S. 579 (1869) (federal corporation mortgaged to federal
government); Rr. Co. v. Peniston, 85 U. S. 5 (1873) (same); Central Pacific Rr. Co. v.
California, 162 U. S. 91 (1896) (state corporation with federal franchises); Alward v.
Johnston, 282 U. S. 509 (1930) (on automobiles used by holder of mail contract), noted
in (1931) 31 COL. L. REv. 899 and (1931) 44 HARv. L. REv. 1141.
64. Clallam County v. U. S. Spruce Production Corp., 263 U. S. 341 (1923) (a WashIng-
ton Corporation); United States v. City of New Brunswick, 276 U. S. 547 (1928) (United
States Housing Corp., incorporated in New York); United States v. Coghlan, 261 Fed.
425 (D. Md. 1919) (Fleet Corp., incorporated in the District of Columbia); King County,
Washington v. U. S. Shipping Board Emergency Fleet Corp., 282 Fed, 950 (C. C. A. 9th,
1922); U. S. Spruce Production Corp. v. Lincoln County, 285 Fed. 388 (D. Ore. 1922):
U. S. Shipping Board Emergency Fleet Corp. v. Delaware County, 17 F. (2d) 40 (C. C. A
3rd, 1927), writ of error dismissed, 275 U. S. 483 (1927), cert. denied, 278 U. S. 607 (1928) ;
Lincoln County v. Pacific Spruce Corp., 26 F. (2d) 435 (C. C. A. 9th, 1928); United States
v. Mayor of Hoboken, 29 F. (2d) 932 (D. N. J. 1928) (Fleet Corp.). See Comment (1923)
36 IARv. L. Rav. 737.
65. King County v. Fleet Corp., supra note 64.
66. Thompson v. Union Pacific Rr. Co., supra note 63.
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ment.67 Although the governmental-proprietary distinction was urged on the
courts in a number of cases to uphold the tax, a discussion of the question was
generally avoided,', and where it was considered, doubts were expressed as
to its validity as applied to the federal government.6P Thus both in the deci-
sions and the dicta there has been a difference of treatment between federally
owned and state owned corporate agents in regard to taxation by the other
government.
A further extension of this principle so as to permit state regulation of cer-
tain agencies would likewise be novel and without legal foundation. No attempt
to introduce the doctrine of equality has ever been made in this field, and the
federal supremacy has been upheld at every point.7° The rule that the states
may regulate the incidental method of conducting the agents' activities
is not a limitation on federal supremacy but a recognition of a possible lack of
repugnance between state and federal law.7 1 Nor should the fact that the
Authority is a separate legal entity have any bearing on the result. For it is
even more completely a public servant than any government officer, since it
has no private existence at all. The problem of the status of such government-
owned corporations has recently become of particular importance because of
the increased use the administration has made of the device, 2  The advantages
67. Clallam County v. U. S. Spruce Production Corp., 263 U. S. 341 (1923).
68. Most of the courts said that the property was used for governmental or public
purposes without discussing the validity of the distinction. See cases cited in note
64, supra.
69. See United States v. Mayor of Hoboken, 29 F. (2d) 932, 939 (D. N. J. 1923) and
Alabama v. United States, supra note 57.
70. See cases cited in notes 44 and 45, supra.
71. See notes 41-45 supra. See also Pembina Mining Co. v. Pennsylvania, 125 U. S.
181, 190 (1888) and Stockton v. Baltimore and N. Y. Rr. Co., 32 Fed. 9, 14 (C. C. D.
N. J. 1887) to the effect that a state may not exclude or impose conditions on a corporate
federal agent.
72. Out of twenty-nine existing examples, eighteen were created by the present admin-
istration (each group being counted as one example). The existing corporations created
up to March 4, 1933, are as follows: The National Banks, 13 ST,%. 100 (1864), 12 U. S.
C. A. 21 (1926); the Panama Rr., 32 STAT. 481 (1902); Federal Reserve Banks, 38 STaT.
251 (1913); Alaska Rr., 38 STAT. 305 (1914); Federal Land Banks and Joint Stock Land
Banks, 39 STAT. 360 (1916); United States Shipping Board Emergency Fleet Corparation,
39 STAT. 729 (1916), amended by 44 STAT. 1083 (1927) to U. S. Shipping Board Merchant
Fleet Corporation; Federal Intermediate Credit Banks, 42 STAT. 1454 (1923) ; Inland Water-
ways Corporation, 43 STAT. 360 (1924); Reconstruction Finance Corporation, 47 STaT. 5
(1932); and the Federal Home Loan Banks, 47 STAT. 725 (1932). There were albo five
temporary war corporations which have gone out of existence. United States Grain Cor-
poration, 40 STAT. 276 (1917); War Finance Corporation, 40 STaT. 506 (1918); United
States Housing Corporation, 40 STAT. 594 (1918); U. S. Sugar Equalization Board, 40 STAT.
276 (1917); and U. S. Spruce Production Corporation, 40 STaT. 888 (1918). Under the
present administration eighteen more have been created. Tennessee Valley Authority, pra
note 3; Home Owners Loan Corporation, P. L. No. 43, 73rd Cong., 1It Sees. (1933); Fed-
eral Deposit Insurance Corporation, P. L. No. 66, 73rd Cong., 1st Sess. (1933) Se. 12 B;
Central Banks for Cooperatives, Production Credit Corporations, Production Credit As-o-
ciations, and Banks for Cooperatives, P. L. No. 75, 73rd Cong., 1st SEs. (1933); Federal
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of this method of administration in the newer fields which the government is
entering are sufficient to assure an increased use in the future.73 In general
these corporations have been held subject to suit in both contract and tort,
apparently on the ground of congressional intent.74 Problems concerning the
relations of such corporations with the government are apparently also con-
sidered solely a question of legislative intent, as if the corporation were merely
an administrative arm of the government.7r Thus the Authority's status as
a government-owned corporation is an argument for rather than against its
immunity from state control. From the legal point of view also, therefore,
it should be held that the states have no power to tax or regulate the Tennessee
Valley Authority.
Surplus Relief Corporation, P. L. No. 67, 73rd Cong., 1st Sess. (1933); Commodity Credit
Corporation, Exec. Order 6340, Oct. 16, 1933; Emergency Housing Corporation, Exec.
Order 6470, Nov. 29, 1933; Electric Home and Farm Authority, Exec. Order 6514, Dec. 19,
1933; Federal Subsistence Homestead Corporation, P. L. No. 67, 73rd Cong., 1st Sess.
(1933) Sec. 208; Federal Farm Mortgage Corporation, 12 MASON'S U. S. CODE SUwP.
No. 3, § 840-7a, Jan. 31, 1934; Export-Import Banks of Washington, Exec. Orders 6581,
Feb. 2, 1934, and 6638, Mar. 9, 1934; Tennessee Valley Associated Cooperatives, incorporated
Jan. 24, 1934, TVA Press Release, May 18, 1934; Federal Credit Unions, 12 MASON's U. S.
CODE Suwpp. No. 3, § 1751, June 26, 1934; Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Cor-
poration, 12 MAsoN's U. S. CODE Strpp. No. 3, § 1724, June 27, 1924; and National
Mortgage Association, 12 MASON's U. S. CODE Supp. No. 3, § 1716, June 27, 1934. Seven-
teen of those now existing are wholly government owned and controlled, and all are federal
agencies and exempted in some respects from state taxation.
73. The freedom from the bureaucratic system of detailed annual appropriation, the
government auditing system, civil service restrictions, and rules regarding government con-
tracts, and the possession of its own credit facilities, free it from congressional interference
and political pressure, and contribute flexibility of organization and policy and fluidity of
financial resources. See VAw Doz N, GOVERNMENT OWNED CORPORATIONS (1926).
74. Sloan Shipyards Co. v. U. S. Shipping Board Emergency Fleet Corp., 258 U. S.
549 (1922), noted in (1923) 32 YALE L. J. 283. See Note (1924) 8 MINN. L. Rv. 427, and
Note (1932) 32 COL. L. REv. 881. Some courts have given as an additional reason the fact
that the corporation was engaged in a commercial enterprise. Gould Coupler Co. v. U. S.
Shipping Board Emergency Fleet Corp., 261 Fed. 717 (S. D. N. Y. 1919); Federal Sugar
Refining Co. v. U. S. Sugar Equalization Board, 268 Fed. 575 (S. D. N. Y. 1920).
75. The Fleet Corporation gets the benefit of preferential telegraph rates allowed to
government departments, U. S. Shipping Board Emergency Fleet Corporation v. Western
Union Telegraph Co., 275 U. S. 415 (1928), and fraudulent claims against it are criminal.
United States v. Walter, 263 U. S. 15 (1923). See notes cited in note 74, supra, and MeGuire,
Government by Corporations (1928) 14 VA. L. REv. 182; Schnell and Wettach, Corpora-
tions as Agencies of the Recovery Program (1934) 12 N. C. L. REV. 77; Comment (1934)
28 ILL. L. REv. 1082.
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